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tioner what, in counsel's honest opinion, would be the result 
of presenting such claimed defense and petitioner, fully ad-
vised in the premises, accepted counsel's opinion and deter-
mined to plead guilty. 
In the circumstances, counsel's representation of petitioner 
was not" pro forma" rather than zealous and active, and such 
representation did not deprive petitioner of the right to the 
effective aid of counsel in any sense cognizable on habeas 
corpus; rather, it is our opinion that even if the rec:ord now 
before us (which, of course, indudes matters which were not 
before the District Court of Appeal in People v. Atchley 
(1955), s1tpra, 132 Cal.App.2d 444) were here on appeal, it 
would not impel the conclusion that there was any reversible 
error. (Gf. People v. Avile.z (1948), 86 Cal.App.2d 289, 296-
297 [194 P.2d 829]; People v. Jrfanchetti (1946), 29 Cal.2d 
452,458-459 [175 P.2d 533) .) 
For the reasons above stated, the order to show cause is 
discharged and the petition is denied. 
Shenk, J., Carter J., Traynor, ,J., Spence, J., and McComb, 
J., concurred. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred in the judgment. 
Petitioner's application for a reheari11g \Yas deuiecll\Iay 22, 
1957. 
[L.A. No. 23847. In Bank. Apr. 24, 1967.] 
FIRST UNITARIAN CHURCH OF' LOS ANGELES (a 
Corporation), Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS AN-
GELES et al., Respondents. 
[1] Taxation-Nature: Duty to Pay.~ Payment of taxes has been 
and is a uniform if not universal demand of government, and 
there is an obligation on the part of the owner of property 
to pay a tax legally assessed. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, ~s 1, 234; [2, 3, 19, 25, 26] 
Taxation, § 67; [ 4-6, 8 J Taxation, § 77; [7] Constitutional Law 
§ 15; [9, 11] Taxation,§ 115; [10] Taxation, §§ 28;), 287; [12, 15, 
17, 22] Taxation, § 69; [13] Constitutional Law, § 163; [14] 
Taxation, § 43; [16] Constitutional r~aw, § 1:55; [18, 20] Consti-
tutional Law, § 115; [21] Taxation, §§ 67, 69; [23, 24] Consti-
tutional Law, § 116. 
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[2]] Id.-Exemptions.-An exemption from taxation is tlw excep-
tion and the unusual, and to provide for it under the laws of 
this state requires constitutional or constitutionally authorized 
statutory authority. 
[3] Id.-Exemptions.-An exemption from taxation is a bounty or 
gratuity on the part of the sovereign and when once granted 
may be withdrawn; it may be granted with or without condi-
tions but where reasonable conditions are imposed they must 
be complied with. 
[ 4] !d.-Exemptions-Church Organizations.-A church organiza-
tion is in no different position initially than any other owner 
of property with reference to its obligations to assist in the 
support of government by the payment of taxes, though such 
organizations, throughout the history of the state, have been 
made special beneficiaries by way of exemptions. 
[5] !d.-Exemptions-Church Property.-Const., art. XX, § 19, 
prohibiting tax exemptions for subversive persons and groups, 
is a valid enactment under state law and is applicable to the 
church property exemption provided for in art. XIII, § llfz; 
its provisions that no person or organization included in the 
proscribed class shall receive an exemption from taxation 
apply to all tax exemption claimants, and its prohibitions are 
declared by its own terms and are mandatory and prohibitory. 
( Const., art. I, § 22.) 
[6] !d.-Exemptions-Church Organizations.-The primary pur-
pose of Const., art. XX, § 19, prohibiting tax exemptions for 
subversive persons and groups, was to provide for protection 
of the revenues of the state against impairment by those who 
would seek to destroy it by unlawful means; it contains no 
exceptions, and applies to churches. 
[7] Constitutional Law- Self-executing Provisions.- N otwith-
standing that a particular constitutional provision may be self-
executing, legislation enacted in aid thereof is not invalid. 
[8] Taxation- Exemptions- Church Organizations.- Assuming 
that Rev. & Tax. Code, § 32, requiring a declaration of loyalty 
on claiming exemption from property tax, is invalid, still 
a church, under the general provisions of state law, is not 
relieved from its obligation otherwise to disclose the facts 
required by § 32. 
[9a, 9b] Id.-Assessors-Duties.-Under the tax laws of the state, 
wholly apart from Rev. & Tax. Code, § 32, requiring a declara-
tion of loyalty on claiming exemption from property tax, 
it is the duty of an assessor to see that all property within 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 71; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 495. 
[5] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 88; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 615. 
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his jurisdiction is legally assessed and that exemptions are 
not improperly allowed, and it is the duty of a property 
owner to cooperate with the assessor and assist him in ascer-
tainment of the facts with reference to taxability or exemption 
by declarations under oath. (Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 254, 441, 
452, 454, 461-463, 1361.) 
(10] !d.-Remedies of Taxpayer-Recovery of Taxes Paid-Plead-
ing and Proof.--If an assessor is satisfied from his investiga-
tions that an exemption from property tax should not be 
allowed he may assess the property as not exempt and if con-
tested compel a determination of the facts in a suit to recover 
the tax paid under protest, in which case it would be necessary 
for the claimant to allege and prove facts with reference to 
the nature, extent and character of the property which would 
justify the exemption and compliance with all valid regulations 
in the presentation and prosecution of the claim. 
[11] Id.-Assessors-Duties.-The presumption of innocence avail-
able to all in criminal prosecutions does not relieve or prevent 
an assessor from making the investigation enjoined on him by 
law to see that exemptions from property taxation are not im-
properly allowed; his administrative determination is not bind-
ing on the tax exemption claimant, but it is sufficient to 
authorize him to tax the property as nonexempt and place the 
burden on the claimant to test the validity of the administra-
tive determination in an action at law. 
[12] !d.-Exemptions-Loyalty Oath.-Rev. & Tax. Code, § 32, re-
quiring a declaration of loyalty on claiming an exemption from 
property tax, implements Const., art. XX, § 19, relating to sub-
versive persons and groups, and provides a direct, time-saving 
and relatively inexpensive method of ascertaining the facts; 
the Legislature could take these factors into consideration and 
also take into account the fact that the segment of house-
holders, which are exempt from the requirements of the code 
section, is so overwhelmingly large as compared with others 
chosen for exemptions that the cost of processing them would 
justify their separate classification. 
[13] Constitutional Law- Classification- Presumptions.-Where 
any state of facts can be reasonably conceived which would 
sustain legislative classification the existence of those facts 
will be presumed. 
[14] Taxation-Subjects-Personal Property.-Under Const., art. 
XIII, § 14, authorizing the Legislature to classify all kinds of 
personal property for taxation, it may classify the personal 
property of householders. 
[15] !d.-Exemptions-Loyalty Oath.-Rev. & Tax. Code, § 32, 
requiring a declaration of loyalty on claiming exemption from 
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property tax, is not invalid because of failure of the Legisla-
ture to include within its requirements those who are entitled 
to exemptions under income tax laws and other tax laws 
wherein certain exemptions are taken into consideration in 
arriving at the amount of tax to be paid; those taxes are in 
categories which are subject to different treatment by separate 
classification. 
[16] Constitutional Law-Classification-Failure to Cover Entire 
Field.-The Legislature is at liberty to select one phase of a 
problem for appropriate action without the necessity of in-
cluding all others which might be affected in the same field of 
legislation. 
[17] Taxation-Exemptions-Loyalty Oath.-Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 32, requiring a declaration of loyalty on claiming exemption 
from property tax, applies to all exemption claimants to which 
it relates and supplies appropriate means for carrying out 
the purposes of Const., art. XX, § 19, prohibiting tax exemp-
tions for subversive persons and groups. 
[18] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Religious Free-
dom.-U.S. Const., 1st Amendment, reflects the philosophy that 
church and state should be separate, but it embraces two con-
cepts, freedom to believe and freedom to 11ct; the first is 
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be; 
conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of 
society. 
[19] Taxation-Exemptions-Limitations.-The limitation imposed 
by Const., art. XX, § 19, prohibiting tax exemptions for sub-
versive persons and groups, as a condition of exemption from 
taxation is not a limitation on mere belief but a limitation on 
action-the advocacy of certain proscribed conduct; what 
one may merely believe is not prohibited; it is only advocates 
of the subversive doctrine who are affected, since advocacy con-
stitutes action and the instigation of action, not mere belief 
or opinion. 
[20] Constitutional Law- Fundamental Rights- Religious Free-
dom.-The exercise of religious activity is subject to some limi-
tation if that exercise is deemed detrimental to society. 
[21] Taxation-Exemptions-Limitations: Loyalty Oath.-There is 
nothing in Const., art. XX, § 19, prohibiting tax exemptions for 
subversive persons and groups, or in Rev. & Tax. Code, § 32, 
requiring a declaration of loyalty on claiming exemption from 
property tax, which interferes with the exercise of religion; a 
church refusing to make such declaration is affected not 
[18] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 200, 201; Am.Jur., 
Constitutional Law, § 312. 
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because it is a religious organization but because it is a tax-
payer favored in law by an exemption for which it has refused 
to qualify. 
[22a, 22b] !d.-Exemptions-Loyalty Oath.-Rev. & Tax. Code, 
§ 32, requiring the making of an oath of loyalty as a prerequi-
site to the granting of a property tax exemption to a church, 
does not impose an unconstitutional limitation on the exercise 
of religion; this oath is not a test of religious opinion and a 
church is not excused from making it any more than any other 
taxpayer. 
[23] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Freedom of Ex-
pression.-Despite tl1e fact that U.S. Const., 1st Amendment, is 
cast in terms of the absolute, it is not to be applied literally; 
there is no absolute right of free speech or unqualified liberty 
to speak. 
[24a, 24b] !d.-Fundamental Rights-Freedom of Expression.-In 
applying the phrase "clear and present danger" with reference 
to the right to free speech, the courts in each case must ask 
whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improb-
ability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to 
avoid the danger. 
[25] Taxation-Exemptions-Purpose.-One of the interests with 
which the state is concerned and which it is attempting to 
promote by granting exemptions from taxation is that of main-
taining the loyalty of its people and thus safeguarding against 
its violent overthrow by internal or external forces. 
[26] Id.-Exemptions-Limitations.-The limitation on freedom of 
speech imposed by Const., art. XX,§ 19, prohibiting tax exemp-
tions for subversive persons and groups, is a conditional one, 
imposed only if a tax exemption is sought; the prohibited 
advocacy is penal in nature, and not one of the fundamental 
guarantees but only a privilege or bounty of the state is with-
held if the exemption claimant prefers to engage in the pro-
hibited criminal advocacy; hence the infringement of free 
speech imposed by such constitutional provision cannot be 
deemed substantial. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Bayard Rhone, ,Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to recover taxes paid under protest and for declara-
tory relief. Judgment for defendants on order sustaining 
general demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend, 
affirmed. 
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William R. Murrish, George T. Altman and Robert L. Brock 
for Appellant. 
Charles E. Beardsley and Stanley A. Weigel as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Gordon Boller, Assist-
ant County Counsel, and Alfred C. DeFlon, Deputy County 
Counsel for Respondents. 
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment for the 
defendants following an order sustaining a general demurrer 
to the complaint without leave to amend. 
The action was brought to recover taxes paid under protest 
and for declaratory relief. 'fhe plaintiff is a duly organized 
nonprofit religious organization with its principal office in 
the city of Los Angeles. It is the owner of real property 
devoted exclusively to religious purposes and located within 
the jurisdiction of, and subject to property taxation by, the 
county and city of Los Angeles. It presented to the assessor 
of Los Angeles County an application for the exemption of its 
property, particularly described, for the fiscal year 1954-1955. 
The application was denied by the assessor on the ground that 
the plaintiff had not qualified for an exemption because it 
had failed and refused to include in the application for ex-
emption the nonsubversive declarations required by section 
32 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. The application was 
otherwise complete. Thereafter the real property of the plain-
tiff was assessed as property not exempt, and within the time 
prescribed by law the plaintiff paid the tax under protest and 
brought this action for the recovery of the sum so paid. The 
assessor refused to allow the exemption because of the pro-
visions of section 19 of article XX of the Constitution1 and 
section 32 of the Revenue and Taxation Code. 2 
Section 19 of article XX was adopted at the general election 
on November 4, 1952, and was placed as a new section in 
that article under the heading ''Miscellaneous Subjects.'' 
The section reads : 
"Section 19. Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
Constitution, no person or organization which advocates the 
overthrow of the Government of the United States or the 
1 Hereinafter referred to as section 19 of article XX. 
2This and all other code sections hereinafter referred to will be to sec-
tions of the Revenue and Taxation Code unless otherwise indicated. 
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State by force or violence or other unlawful means or who 
advocates the support of a foreign government against the 
United States in the event of hostilities shall: 
'' (a) Hold any office or employment under this State, in-
cluding but not limited to the University of California, or 
with any county, city or county, city, district, political sub-
division, authority, board, bureau, commission or other public 
agency of this State; or 
"(b) Receive any exemption from any tax imposed by this 
State or any county, city or county, city, district, political 
subdivision, authority, board, bureau, commission or other 
public agency of this state. 
''The Legislature shall enact such laws as may be necessary 
to enforce the provisions of this section.'' ( Stats. 1953.) 
Following the amendment to the Constitution section 32 
was added to the Revenue and Taxation Code in 1953. It is as 
follows: 
''Any statement, return, or other document in which is 
claimed any exemption, other than the householder's exemp-
tion, from any property tax imposed by this State or any 
county, city or county, city, district, political subdivision, 
authority, board, bureau, commission or other public agency 
of this State shall contain a declaration that the person or 
organization making the statement, return, or other document 
does not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the 
United States or of the State of California by force or violence 
or other unlawful means nor advocate the support of a foreign 
government against the United States in event of hostilities. 
I£ any such statement, return, or other document does not 
contain such a declaration, the person or organization mak-
ing such statement, return, or other document shall not re-
ceive any exemption from the tax to which the statement, re-
turn, or other document pertains. Any person or organiza-
tion who makes such declaration knowing it to be false is 
guilty of a felony. This section shall be construed so as to 
effectuate the purpose of Section 19 of Article XX of the 
Constitution." ( Stats. 1953, p. 3114.) 
The plaintiff contends that both the constitutional provision 
and the code section are invalid. It is argued that the im-
position and collection of taxes sought to be recovered and the 
denial of the church property tax exemption provided for 
in section 1% of article XIII of the Constitution, as applied 
to the plaintiff church and all other churches similarly 
situated, was and is in violation of the provisions of the 
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state and federal Constitutions which require reasonable and 
proper classifications for purposes of taxation and provide 
for freedom of religion, freedom of speech and the protection 
of other rights specified in the protest a copy of which is at-
tached to and made a part of the complaint. The provisions 
of the protest will be referred to later on in this opinion. 
It is noted that section 19 of article XX does not specifically 
mention churches or any other organizations or individuals 
which are subject to its provisions. Its terms are general 
and apply to all owners of property as to which exemption 
from taxation might be claimed. 
[1] It is fundamental that the payment of taxes has 
been and is a uniform if not a universal demand of govern-
ment, and that there is an obligation on the part of the owner 
of property to pay a tax legally assessed. [2] An exemption 
from taxation is the exception and the unusual. To provide 
for it under the laws of this state requires constitutional or 
constitutionally authorized statutory authority. [3] It is a 
bounty or gratuity on the part of the sovereign and when 
once granted may be withdrawn. It may be granted with or 
without conditions but where reasonable conditions are im-
posed they must be complied with. 
[4] A church organization is in no different position in-
itially than any other owner of property with reference to 
its obligations to assist in the support of government by the 
payment of taxes. Church organizations, however, through-
out the history of the state, have been made special bene-
ficiaries by way of exemptions. A brief reference to the 
constitutional and statutory background relating to this and 
other exemptions in this state will be made. 
We find in the Constitution of 1849 the following pro-
visions: '' 'l'axation shall be equal and uniform throughout 
thr state. All property in this state shall be taxed in proportion 
to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law .... " (Laws 
of California, 1850-1853, p. 57, art. XI, § 13.) No provision 
for exemption from taxation is found in that Constitution. 
In 1853 the Legislature passed an act entitled "AN AcT to 
pmvide Reverwe for the Support of the Government of this 
State.'' (Laws of California, 1850-1853, p. 669.) In section 
1 of article I it was provided that all land in the state owned 
or claimed by any person or corporation shall be listed for 
taxation. In section 2 of the same article it was provided 
that' "l'he following property shall not be listed for taxation." 
Thc>n follow sevrral paragraphs where numerous elassifiea-
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tions of property are named, such as publicly owned prop-
erty, town halls, public squares, colleges, schoolhouses, public 
hospitals, asylums, poorhom:rs, ermetrries and grayeyarcls. 
In paragraph 5 it was provided that the following also shall 
not be listed for taxation: ''Churches, chapels, and other build-
ings for religious worship, with their furniture and equip-
ments, and the lots of ground appurtenant thereto and used 
therewith, so long as the same shall be used for that purpose 
only." (Laws of California, 1850-1853, p. 671.) 
This statutory method of providing for exemptions con-
tinued until the adoption of the Constitution of 1879. Sec-
tion 1 of article XIII of the new Constitution required con-
stitutional authority for exemptions. It was there provided 
that "All property in this State except as otherwise in this 
Constitution provided, . . . shall be taxed in proportion to 
its value, to be ascertained as provided by law .... " In sub-
sequent sections of the same article the exemption of numerous 
classes of particularly described property is provided for. 
Section llj2 of article XIII provides for the church exemp-
tion as follows: ''All buildings, and so much of the real prop-
erty on which they are situated as may be required for the 
convenient use and occupation of said buildings, when the 
same are used solely and exclusively for religious worship 
... shall be free from taxation .... " 
In 1944 section 1c was added to article XIII which pro-
vides that "In addition to such exemptions as are now pro-
vided in this Constitution, the Legislature may exempt from 
taxation all or any portion of property used exclusively for 
religious, hospital or charitable purposes ... " This pro-
vision did not have the effect of changing existing laws with 
reference to the exemption of church property excrpt to 
authorize the Legislature to extend the exemption of that 
property as provided for in section 11/2 of articlr XIII to its 
personal property. Whether that section is self-executing is 
of no concern for in 1903 the Legislature added section 3611 
to the Political Code, repeating the constitutional language 
which exempted church real property and providing among 
other things that ''any person claiming property to be ex-
empt from taxation under this section shall make a return 
thereof to the assessor annually, the same as property is listed 
for taxation, and shall accompany the same by an affidavit 
showing that the building is used solely and exclusively for 
religious worship, and that the described portion of the real 
property claimed as exempt is required for the convenient 
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use and occupation of such building .... " ( Stats. 1903, 
p. 21.) 'l'he reference in that section to property which "is 
Jisted for taxation" was in contemplation of section 8, article 
XIII of the Constitution, ·which has provided since 1879 
that ''The Legislature shall by law require each taxpayer 
in this State to make and deliver to the county assessor, an-
nually, a statement, under oath, setting forth specifically all 
the real and personal property owned by such taxpayer, or 
in his possession, or under his control, at 12 o'clock meridian, 
on the first Monday of March.'' 
Section 3611 of the Political Code was carried into the 
ReYenue and Taxation Code in 1939 as section 254, which 
provides that any "person claiming the church ... exemp-
tion shall make a return of the property to the assessor an-
nually, the same as property is listed for taxation, and shall 
acrompany it by an affidaYit, giving any information required 
by the'' State Board of EqualizaHon. The form prescribed 
by the State Board of Equalization includes the nonsubversive 
portion of the affidavit, which the plaintiff has refused to in-
clude in its return. 
[5] No meritorious argument has been or can be ad-
Yanced to the effect that section 19 of article XX is not a valid 
enactment under state law or that it is inapplicable to the 
rhnrch pro[1erty exemption provided for in section 11/z of 
article XIII. Section 19 of article XX was adopted in ac-
cordance with the procedurrs rrquired by the Constitution 
for an amendment to that document by vote of the electors 
of this state. Its provisions are plain and unambiguous and 
require no interpretation in the matter of their prohibitions. 
In dirert terms it proYinrs that no pen~on or organization 
includrd in the proscribed class shall receive an exemption 
from any tax imposed by the state or any taxing agency of 
the state. It applies to all tax exemption claimants. Its 
prohibitions arc derlared by its own terms and are manda-
tory and prohibitory. ( Const., art. I, § 22.) By its enact-
ment the people of the state declared the public policy of 
·withholding from the owners of property in this state who 
engage in the prohibited activities the benefits of tax exemp-
tion. The clenonncen activities are criminal offenses under 
state law (Stats. 1919, p. 281), and the act of Congress known 
as the Smith Act (54 Stat. 670) makes it unlawful to advo-
ratP the overthrow of the government by force and violence. 
[6] It may properly be said that the primary purpose of 
the people of the state in the enactment of section 19 of 
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article XX was to provide for the protection of the revenues 
of the state from impairment by those who would seek to de-
stroy it by unlawful means. It contains no exceptions. It 
applies to churches when it provides that "Notwithstanding 
any other provisions of this Constitution'' its prohibitions 
shall apply to all tax exemption claimants, and declares in 
effect that the tax revenues of the state shall not be depleted 
by those who would seek to destroy it in violation of the 
criminal laws of the state and the nation. It is clear that 
section 19 of article XX is a valid enactment under the Con-
stitution of the state. That it was properly incorporated in 
the Constitution as a matter of state policy may not be ques-
tioned. 
It is then to consider whether section 32 is a valid im-
plementation of section 19 of article XX. Section 32 declares 
that ''This section shall be construed so as to effectuate the 
purpose of Section 19 of article XX of the Constitution.'' 
[7] Notwithstanding the fact that a particular provision may 
be self-executing, legislation enacted in aid thereof is not 
invalid. (Chesney v. Byram, 15 Cal.2d 460, 463 [101 P.2d 
1106 J.) The code section declares within itself its purpose 
but that purpose is obvious without the declaration. 
The plaintiff contends that section 32 is void for several 
reasons. First, because of the exception from its require-
ments of householders who are entitled to an exemption of 
$100 of assessed value of their personal property as provided 
for in section 101;2 of article XIII of the Constitution. It 
is contended that this exception renders the section lacking 
in uniformity and thus provides for an unlawful classification 
of taxable property under the law. Secondly, that it violates 
the federal constitutional guarantees of separation of church 
and state and freedom of speech. The first contention will be 
considered in advance of the others for the reason that it in-
volves the application of the Constitution and laws of the 
state relating to taxation. 
[8] If it be assumed for the moment that section 32 is in-
valid for any of the reasons stated, still the plaintiff, under 
the general provisions of state law, is not relieved from its 
obligation otl1erwise to disclose the facts required by section 
32. In this connection the powers and duties of the assessor 
and the obligations of the plaintiff as the owner of real and 
personal property must be considered in the light of state law. 
Those powers, duties and obligations are set forth generally 
in the Revenue and Taxation Code. 
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[9a] It is the duty of the assessor to see that all property 
within his jurisdiction is legally assessed and that exemp-
tions are not improperly allowed. He is liable on his bond 
''for all taxes on property which is unassessed through his 
wilful failure or neglect.'' ( § 1361.) By section 441 it is 
provided in accordance with section 8 of article XIII of the 
Constitution that ''Every person shall file a written property 
statement, under oath, with the assessor between noon on the 
first Monday in March and 5 p. m. on the last Monday in 
May, annually, and within such time as the assessor may 
appoint. At any time, as required by the assessor for assess-
ment purposes, every person shall furnish information or 
records for examination.'' For use by the assessor and the 
property owner the State Board of Equalization is required 
to prepare the forms of blanks for the property statement. 
( § 452.) 'fhe assessor may subpoena and examine any per-
son in relation to any statement furnished by him. ( § 454.) 
Any person who wilfully states to the assessor anything which 
he knows to be false, in any oral or written statement, even not 
under oath, but required or authorized to be made and relat-
ing to an assessment, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (§ 461.) 
Section 462 provides that every person is guilty of a mis-
demeanor ·who, after proper demand by the assessor, refuses 
to give the assessor a list of his taxable property or ''Refuses 
to s·wear to the list.'' By section 463 it is provided, among 
other things, that every person shall forfeit $100 to the people 
of the state, to be recovered by action brought in their name 
by the assessor, for each refusal to furnish the property state-
ment or to fail to appear and testify when requested to do so 
by the assessor. 
It thus appears that under the tax laws of the state wholly 
apart from section 32 it is the duty of the assessor to ascer-
tain the facts with reference to the taxability or exemption 
from taxation of property within his jurisdiction. And it is 
also the duty of the property owner to cooperate with the 
assessor anc1 assist him in the ascertainment of these facts by 
declarations under oath. 
vVith particular reference to the many and various tax 
exemptions, the Revenue and Taxation Code provides for the 
ascertainment of the facts as a prerequisite for exemptions. 
Those facts in many instances must be made known to the 
assessor by the affidavit of the tax exemption claimant. They 
include, among others, veterans exemptions, church exemp-
tions, welfare exemptions, college exemptions and orphanage 
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exemptions. In the case of the church exemption the affidavit 
shall give "any information required" to carry the exemption 
into effect. ( § 254.) It is significant to note that nowhere in 
the law of the state is there a requirement for the property 
owner to make a showing for tax exemptions in the case of 
householders, cemeteries, game refuges and a few others. It 
thus appears that the Legislature in addition to the exception 
of householders from the requirements of section 32 has made 
no requirement otherwise for any showing on their part of 
their right to the exemption, either by affidavit or otherwise. 
If the exclusion of householders from the requirement of 
section 32 renders that section void as discriminatory or lack-
ing in uniformity it would seem to follow that the entire 
Revenue and Taxation Code with reference to procedures to 
qualify for exemptions would be void for the same reason. 
But obviously no such claim is made. 
As stated it is the duty of the assessor to see that exemp-
tions are not allowed contrary to law and this of course in-
cludes those which are contrary to the prohibitions provided 
for in section 19 of article XX. With the aid of section 32 
his task is facilitated by the means therein supplied. With-
out that aid he is nevertheless required to ascertain the facts 
with reference to tax exemption claimants. Those facts may 
be disclosed in several different ways. In the instances in 
which he is without the assistance or cooperation of the tax 
exemption claimant and he is relegated to his own devices 
in discovering the facts he may do so by the examination 
under oath of the exemption claimant. ( § 454.) [10] If he 
is satisfied from his investigations that the exemption should 
not be allowed he may assess the property as not exempt and 
if contested compel a determination of the facts in a suit to 
recover the tax paid under protest. In such a case it would 
be necessary for the claimant to allege and prove facts with 
reference to the nature, extent and character of the property 
which would justify the exemption and compliance with all 
valid reg-nlations in the presentation and prosecution of the 
claim. [9b] In any event it is the duty of the assessor to 
ascertain the facts from any legal source available. In per-
forming this task he is engaged in the assembly of facts 
which are to serve as a guide in arriving at his conclusion 
whether an exemption should or should not be allowed. That 
Ponclnsion is in no wise a final determination that the claim-
ant brlongs to a class proscribed by section 19 of article XX 
or is guilty of any activity there denounced. [11] The pre-
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sumption of innocence available to all in criminal prosecutions 
does not in a case such as this relieve or prevent the assessor 
from making the investigation enjoined upon him by law to 
see that exemptions are not improperly allowed. His ad-
ministrative determination is not binding on the tax exemp-
tion claimant but it is sufficient to authorize him to tax the 
property as nonexempt and to place the burden on the claim-
ant to test the validity of his administrative determination 
in an action at law. ]'or the obvious purpose, among others, 
of avoi,ling litigation, the Legislature, throughout the years 
has sought to relieve the assessor of the burden, on his own 
illitiatiYr and at the public expense, of ascertaining the facts 
with reference to tax exemption claimants. [12] In addition 
to the means heretofore and otherwise provided by law the 
Legislature, with special reference to the implementation of 
section 19 of article XX, has enacted section 32. That section 
proYides a direct, timesaving and relatively inexpensive 
method of ascertaining the facts. The Legislature could take 
these factors into consideration. It could also take into ac-
count the fact that the segment of householders in this state 
is so overwhelmingly large as compared with others chosen 
for exemptions that the cost of processing them would justify 
their separate classification. [13] Where any state of facts 
can be reasonably conceived which would sustain legislative 
classification the existence of those facts will be presumed. 
(Lelande v. Lowe1·JJ, 26 Cal.2d 224, 232-233 [157 P.2d 639, 
175 A.L.R. 1109] .) [14] Furthermore, aside from the power 
of the Legislature to classify for the purpose of general legis-
lation (see Reclamation District v. Riley, 192 Cal. 147, 156 
[218 P. 762] ; 24 CaLJur. 432) there is another and more 
conclusive reason why it may classify the personal property 
of householders. Section 14 of article XIII of the Constitu-
tion was amended in 1933 to provide that the Legislature 
''shall have the power to IJrovide for the assessment, levy and 
collection of taxes upon all forms of tangible personal prop-
erty ... may classify any and all kinds of personal property 
for the purposes of assessment and taxation in a manner and 
at a rate or rates in proportion to value different from any 
other property in this State subject to taxation and may ex-
empt entirely from taxation any or all forms, types or classes 
of personal property." Of this constitutional provision this 
court said in Roehm v. Connty of Oran(fe, 32 Cal.2d 280 at 
11ages 283-284 [196 P.2c1 5501 : "Article XIII of the California 
Constitution as first adopted provided for a uniform property 
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tax upon real and personal property alike. This requirement 
of uniform taxation of real and personal property, however, 
has been abandoned by subsequent amendments. Under these 
amendments the Legislature may classify personal property 
for purposes of taxation or exempt all personal property or 
any form, type, or class thereof,'' and on page 285 the court 
declared that this authorization to the Legislature to classify 
tangible personal property is ''all inclusive'' and covers ''all 
forms" of tangible personal property. The personal property 
of the householders falls within the kind of personal property 
which the Legislature was constitutionally authorized to 
classify for purposes of taxation. 
There is therefore no merit in the plaintiff's contention that 
the exception of householders from the requirements of sec-
tion 32 renders that section invalid. [15] There is likewise 
no merit in the contention that the section is invalid because 
of the failure of the Legislature to include within its require-
ments those who are entitled to exemptions under income tax 
laws and numerous other tax laws wherein certain exemptions 
are taken into consideration in arriving at the amount of the 
tax to be paid. Those taxes are in categories which are 
subject to different treatment by separate classification. 
[16] The Legislature is at liberty to select one phase of a 
problem :for appropriate action without the necessity of in-
cluding all others which might be affected in the same field 
of legislation. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 
348 U.S. 483, 489 [75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563], and cases 
there cited.) [17] Section 32 applies to all exemption 
claimants to which it relates and supplies appropriate means 
for carrying out the purposes of section 19 of article XX. 
The foregoing application of tax laws of the state is pecu-
liarly a matter of state concern. ( Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 
U.S. 466 [27 S.Ct. 550, 51 L.Ed. 882] ; Orr v. Gilman, 183 
U.S. 278 [22 S.Ct. 213, 46 L.Ed. 196]; 24 Cal.Jur. 434-435.) 
We turn now to the question of the validity of the consti-
tutional amendment and implementing legislation under guar-
antees of the federal Constitution. We approach this phase 
of the case in the light of the fact that section 19 of article 
XX prescribes no penal sanctions and in a governmental 
sense may be deemed merely a declaration of state policy 
with reference to its own tax structure. However, the plain-
tiff has taken the position that this constitutional provision 
is in reality an unlawful limitation on its constitutional rights 
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which are protected by the federal Constitution. This ques-
tion is extensively argued on behalf of the plaintiff. 
It is claimed that section 19 of article XX imposes an 
unconstitutional condition on the right to a tax exemption 
in that it violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the federal Constitution which prohibit, among other things, 
the making of any law ''respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " (Sec 
McColl11m v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 2ml, 210 [68 
S.Ct. 461, 92 hEel. 649, 2 A.L.R.2d 1338] ; Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 
A.L.R. 1352] .) 
[18] Without the slightrst doubt the First Amendment 
reflects the philosophy that (•burch and state should be kept 
separate. (Zor-ach v. Clauson (1952), 343 U.S. 306, 312 [72 
S.Ct. 679, 96 hEel. 9;54]; E'i·e1·son v. Boa1·d of Eclncation, 
:330 U.S. 1, 59 [67 S.Ct. 504, 91 hEel. 711, 168 A.L.R. 1392] .) 
However, the First ''Amendment embraces two concepts,-
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is an abso-
lute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Con-
duct remains subject to regulation for the protection of 
society .... " (Cantwell v. Connecticnt, S1lpm, 310 U.S. 
296, 303-304; sre also Unit eel States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 
86 [64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148] .) [19] In the present 
case it is apparent that the limitation imposed by section 19 
of article XX as a condition of exemption from taxation, 
is not a limitation on mere belief but is a limitation on 
action-the advocacy of certain proscribed conduct. ~What 
one may merely believe is not prohibited. It is only advocates 
of the subversive doctrines who are affected. Advocacy con-
stitutes action and the instigation of action, not mere belief 
or opmwn. (See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 [45 S.Ct. 
625, 69 L.Ed. 1138] ; Leubuschcr v. Commissioner of Int. 
Rev., 54 F'.2d 998, 999.) 
IN e are concerned, then, not with the freedom to believe 
but with the limited freedom to act. [20] The exercise of 
religious activity has long been recognized as subject to some 
limitation if that exercise is deemed detrimental to society. 
In Reynolds v. Unitecl States, 98 U.S. 145 [25 L.Ed. 244], 
the plaintiff was a church member and a conscientious practi-
tioner of its established doctrine >Yhich encouraged polygamy. 
The Supreme Court in holding that such religious activity 
was subjeet to legislative limitations, stated at page 167 that 
to permit exeeptions based on religions doe trine "would be 
to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior 
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to the law of the land, and in effret to permit every citizen 
to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only 
in name under such circumstances." (See also Cleveland v. 
United States, 329 U.S. 14 [67 S.Ct. 13, 91 L.Ed. 12]; Prince 
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 [64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645] .) 
'rhere are decisions ·wherein statutory provisions having some 
effect on religious aetivity have been upheld on the ground 
that their effect was only incidental. In Zorach v. Clauson 
( 1952), supr-a, 343 U.S. 306, the Supreme Court sustained 
the New York "released time" statutory provisions whereby 
public schools were permitted to release children for religious 
purposes during a part of the normal school day. Conten-
tions were made to the effect that those provisions prohibited 
the ''free exercise'' of religion or were ''respecting an estab-
lishment of religion'' within the meaning of the First Amend-
ment. The court concluded at pages 312-313 that the First 
Amendment ''studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, 
in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency 
one on the other. That is the common sense of the matter. 
Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens to each other 
-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches could 
not be required to pay even property taxes. Municipalities 
would not be permitted to render police or fire protection 
to religious groups. Policemen who helped parishioners into 
their places of worship would violate the Constitution. Pray-
ers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in 
the messages of the Chief Executive; the proclamations mak-
ing 'rhanksgiving Day a holiday; 'so help me God' in our 
courtroom oaths-these and all other references to the Al-
mighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our 
ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. . . . We 
would have to press the concept of separation of Church and 
State to those extremes to condemn the present law on con-
stitutional grounds." 
[21] In the present case there is nothing in the new enact-
ments, either constitutional or statutory, which interferes 
with the free exercise of religion. The plaintiff is affected 
not because it is a religious organization but because it is a 
taxpayer favored in the law by an exemption for which it 
has refused to qualify. The plaintiff has failed to point out 
what tenet or doctrine of its faith is infringed upon by com-
pelling it to qualify for the exemption. Those tenets and 
doctrines are set forth in a document attached to the protest 
of the payment of its taxes and is made a part of the com-
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plaint. It announces to the world the plaintiff's high prin-
ciples and purposes. The prohibited activity cannot, with 
any reason whatsoever, be consistent with or be tolerated by 
the religious doctrines there published and subscribed to by 
the plaintiff. As against a claim that such advocacy might 
be included within religious teaching, the Supreme Court 
has disposed of the contention. In JJ1urdock v. Pennsylvania, 
319 U.S. 105 [63 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81], 
the court stated at page 109 that "we do not intimate or 
suggest ... that any conduct can be made a religious rite 
and by the zeal of the practitioners swept into the First 
Amendment. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161-167 
[25 L.Ed. 244], and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 [10 S.Ct. 
299, 33 L.Ed. 637] denied any such claim to the practice 
of polygamy and bigamy. Other claims may well arise which 
deserve the same fate." In Davis v. Beason, cited in the 
Murdock case, the court said of the advocacy of plural mar-
riages : ''To call their advocacy a tenet of religion is to 
offend the common sense of mankind .... The term 'religion' 
has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, 
and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being 
and character, and of his obedience to His will. ... It is 
assumed by counsel of the petitioner, that because no mode 
of worship can be established or religious tenets enforced 
in this country, therefore any form of worship may be fol-
lowed and any tenets, however destructive of society, may 
be held and advocated, if asserted to be a part of the religious 
doctrines of those advocating and practising them. But noth-
ing is further from the truth .... It docs not follow that 
everything which may be so called can be tolerated. Crime 
is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any par-
ticular sect may designate as religion.'' As above noted the 
advocacy of the conduct prohibited has been made criminal 
by Congress (Smith Act, 54 Stat., part I, p. 670 [1940] ), 
and through numerous statutory provisions by state legis-
latures it is well established that such advocacy is against 
local public policy. (See Levering Act, Stats. 1951 [3d Ex. 
Sess. 1950, ch. 7], p. 15.) In upholding the validity of the 
Levering Act this court in Packman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 
676 [249 P .2d 267], stated that the oath required there and 
similar in effect to the present one, was "ohYiously not a 
test of religious opinion.'' 
[22a] It is further claimed by the plaintiff that section 
32 imposes unconstitutional limitations upon the exercise of 
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religion. As possibly affecting religion, section 32, in addi-
tion to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, requires 
the making of an oath. Since this oath is ''obviously not a 
test of religious opinion" the plaintiff is not excused from 
making it any more than any other taxpayer. It appears that 
an oath was subscribed on behalf of the plaintiff by one of 
its officers when it filed its affidavit with the claim for ex-
emption and its complaint in this action was also verified 
on its behalf. If the making of the oath is objectionable to 
the plaintiff it must be for reasons relating to the content of 
the particular oath and not merely because it is an oath. 
This contention, therefore, may not be sustained. 
It is also claimed that section 19 of article XX is a re-
striction on freedom of speech. The phrase ''freedom of 
speech" is helpful in bringing to mind the concept which it 
means to convey, but as is often the case such a descriptive 
phrase assumes a literal meaning which causes difficulty and 
confusion in the development of the law surrounding it. 
,Justice Holmes aptly stated that it "is one of the misfor-
tunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and 
thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.'' 
(See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 390 [32 S.Ct. 
793, 56 L.Ed. 1114, 1135] ; see also Corwin, Bowing Out 
"Clear and Present Damger," 27 Notre Dame Lawyer 325.) 
[23] Despite the fact that the First Amendment is cast 
in terms of the absolute it is not to be applied literally. 
There never has been an absolute right of free speech or 
an unqualified liberty to speak. "Speech" in the broad 
sense embodies all means of expression and communication. 
It is the primary vehicle by which individuals and organi-
zations converse and transmit ideas, information and knowl-
edge, and is deserving of the highest degree of protection 
and preservation. But there are other important interests 
of society which, at times, may conflict with the interest of 
individuals or groups in the exercise of this asserted freedom. 
In such circumstances the courts must declare when the 
individual or group does or does not have a right to speak 
freely, depending on a balance of the individual's right to 
speak out as against the harm or injury society may suffer 
as a result of such speech. The courts have been called upon 
to engage in this weighing process in many instances. Illus-
trative are those which protect society from a breach of the 
peace (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 f62 S.Ct. 
766, 86 L.Ed. 1031]), "loud and raucous" noises caused by 
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sound trueks (Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 [69 S.Ct. 448, 
93 L.Ed. 513, 10 A.L.R.2d 608]), interruption of the free 
flow of commerce (American Comnmnications Assn. v. Do1lds, 
339 U.S. 382 [70 S.Ct. 67 4, 94 L.Ed. 925] ) and the like. 
[24a] The standard by which the various interests have 
been balanced has, until recently, been the so-called ''clear 
and present danger" test. It was heretofore declared that 
the right to free speech could be infringed upon only in situ-
ations where it appeared that the "words used are used in 
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils" sought to be repressed. (Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L.Ed. 470] .) How-
ever, in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 [71 S.Ct. 857, 
95 L.Ed. 1137], the Supreme Court, reviewing its earlier 
decisions in this field, reconsidered the test in the light of 
existing and recognized realities and in conclusion stated: 
"Chief Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority below, 
interpreted the phrase as follows: 'In each case [courts] 
must ask whether the gravity of the "evil," discounted by 
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as 
is necessary to avoid the danger.' 183 F.2d at 212. "\Ve 
adopt this statement of the rule. As articulated by Chief 
,Judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive as any other 
we might devise at this time. It takes into consideration 
those factors which we deem relevant, and relates their sig-
nificances. More we cannot expect from words.'' By that 
statement of the test the standard by which a weighing of 
interests is to be made is clearly indicated. 
The interest of the state in protecting its revenue raising 
program from subversive exploitation has already been con-
sidered. [25] There are additional interests with which the 
state is concerned and which it is attempting to promote by 
granting exemptions from taxation. Included is the interest 
of the state in maintaining the loyalty of its people and thus 
safeguarding against its violent overthrow by internal or 
external forces. This legitimate objective is sought to be 
accomplished by placing in a favored economic position, and 
thus to promote their well being and sphere of influence, those 
particular persons and groups of individuals who are capable 
of formulating policies relating to good morals and respect 
for the law. It has been said that when church properties 
arp exrmpted from taxation ''it mnst be because. apart from 
religious considerations, churches are regarded as institutions 
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established to inculcate principles of sound morality, leading 
eitizens to a more ready obedience to the laws." ( Cmmty of 
Santa Clam v. Southern J>ac. R. Co., 18 P. 385, 400 [9 Sawy. 
165]; 24 Cal.Jur. 105.) The same may be said of others 
enjoying tax exemptions, notably veterans (art. XIII, § 1%; 
Allied At·chiteets Assn. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431 [221 P. 209, 
30 A.L.R. 1029]; Vetemns' Welfare Boar·rl v. Riley, 188 Cal. 
G07, 611 [206 P. 631]), colleges (art. XIII,§ 1a) and charitable 
organizations (art. XIII, § 1e) whieh, together with church 
groups, occupy positions whereby they may exert a salutary 
influence on the moral well-being of the community. Encour-
ag·ement to loyalty to our institutions and an incentive to 
defend one's country in the event of hostilities are doctrines 
which the state has plainly promulgated and intends to foster. 
It is the high purpose residing in its people that the state 
is attempting to encourage in its endeavor to protect itself 
against subversive infiltration. The propriety of that objec-
tive is recognized by the Supreme Court in the Dennis case 
(Dennis v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. 494) where it said 
at page 509: "Overthrow of the Government by force and 
violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the 
Government to limit speech. Indeed, this is the ultimate value 
of any society, for if a society cannot protect its very structure 
from armed internal attack, it must follow that no subordi-
nate value can be protected." 
Obviously, a program of tax exemption designed to promote 
adherence to the principles of our government but constrained 
to include within its bounty persons or organizations actively 
advocating subversion and the support of enemies in time of 
hostilities, would be wholly without reason and result in its 
own defeat. 
[24b] The test requires further that consideration be 
given not only to the "gravity of the 'evil' " sought to be 
repressed but that the evil be ''discounted by its improba-
bility." The Dennis ease involved the validity of the Smith 
Aet which prohibited and made criminal the advocacy of the 
activities denounced by the people of this state in its Con-
stitution. In speaking of the imminence of the threat posed 
by the advocacy of subversive activities, the court at page 
509 stated: "If Government is aware that a group aiming 
at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members 
and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when 
the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the Gov-
ernment is required .... Certainly an attempt to overthrow 
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the Government by force, ewn though doomed from the outset 
because of inadequate numbers or povver of the revolution-
ists, is a sufficient evil for Congress to prevent.'' In that 
case the court upheld an instruction to the jury that if the 
defendants actively advocated governmental overthrow by 
force and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit, 
then as a "matter of law ... there is sufficient danger of 
a substantive evil that the Congress has a right to prevent 
to justify the application of the statute under the First 
Amendment of the Constitution.'' In the present case the 
constitutional provision is concerned with those who advocate 
the same prohibited activity. It must be said that such ad-
vocacy from whatever source poses a threat to our government 
and that the gravity of the evil is not to be materially dis-
counted by its improbability within the meaning of the test 
employed in the Dennis case. 
[26] Against the fundamental interest sought to be safe-
guarded by the state it is necessary to consider and balance 
the interest of those who assert that their right to speak has 
been unduly limited. From what has heretofore been said 
it is apparent that the limitation on speech is a conditional 
one, imposed only if a tax exemption is sought; that the pro-
hibited advocacy is penal in nature, and that not one of the 
fundamental guarantees but only a privilege or bounty of 
the state is withheld if the exemption claimant prefers to 
engage in the prohibited criminal advocacy. It is obvious, 
therefore, that by no standard can the infringement upon 
freedom of speech imposed by section 19 of article XX be 
deemed a substantial one. 
[22b] Apart from considerations involving the constitu-
tional amendment the additional requirement of an oath im-
posed by section 32, of and by itself, gives no cause for the 
plaintiff to complain that it is improperly deprived of con-
stitutional freedoms where compliance with the oath require-
ments otherwise may properly be imposed. (Chesney v. 
Byram, supra, 15 Cal.2d 460, 465-468.) 
Statutory limitations on the free exercise of speech similar 
in nature to the present limitation have been imposed as 
valid conditions upon which some privilege, benefit or con-
ditional right has been withheld by a state. For example, 
as a condition to obtaining or maintaining employment state 
employees have been required to subscribe to oaths which 
declare their nonaclvocacy of subversive activities (Packman 
v. Leonard, supra, 39 Cal.2d 676) ; as have county employees 
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(Hirschman v. County of Los Angeles, 39 Cal.2d 698 [249 
P.2d 287, 250 P.2d 145] ; Steiner v. DMby, 88 Cal.App.2d 
481 [199 P.2d 429]), municipal employees ( Garne1· v. Board 
of Public Works of Los Anocles, 341 U.S. 716 [71 S.Ct. 909, 
95 L.Ed. 1317], affirming Garner v. Board of Public W arks, 
98 Cal. A pp.2d 493 [ 220 P .2d 958] ) , public school teachers 
(Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 [72 S.Ct. 380, 
96 hE d. 517, 27 A.L.R.2d 4 72] ; Steinmetz v. Caliform·a State 
BoaTel of Edtwcdion, 44 Cal.2d 816 [285 P.2d 617]; Board 
of Education v. Eiscnbcr[J, 129 Cal.App.2d 732 [277 P.2d 
943]; Board of Education v. Wilkinson, 125 Cal.App.2d 100 
[270 P.2d 82]), and candidates for public offices ( Gerende 
v. Baltimore etc. Board of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 [71 S.Ct. 
565, 95 LEd. 745]; Shttb v. Simpson, 196 Md. 177 [76 A.2d 
332]). 'l'he right to a bounty or other benefits from the state 
has been so conditioned in the case of applicants for state 
unemployment benrfits. (State v. Hamilton, 92 Ohio App. 
285 [110 N.E.2d 37]; Dworken v. Collopy, (Ohio) 91 N.E.2d 
564.) Even the right to vote ( Opin·ion of the Jttsfices, 252 Ala. 
351 [40 So.2d 849] ), and to citizenship (United States v. 
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 [49 S.Ct. 448,73 L.Ed. 889]) has 
been so conditioned. 
'l'he plaintiff contends that the constitutional amendment 
and implementing legislation are invalid for other reasons 
based on constitutional guarantees. Such contentions are 
without merit in view of what has been said in disposing of 
the basic contentions presented. 
-<'Htention has been directed to the recent decision in Penn-
sylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 [76 S.Ct. 477, 100 L.Ed. 
640] (April 2, 1956), wherein the Supreme Court declared 
invalid a Pennsylvania penal provision (Pa. Penal Code, 
§ 207, 18 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., § 4207) which made it a 
erime to advocate the violent overthrow of the federal or state 
government. Reasons for the decision in that case were that 
Congress had occupied the field to the exclusion of "parallel" 
state legislation; that the dominant interest of the federal 
government required that such "prosecutions" should be ex-
clusively within the control of the federal government, and 
that the "PennsylYania Statute presents a peculiar danger 
of interferenee with the federal program." It is clear from 
the opinion of the court in that case that the exclusion of 
state sedition legislation was limited to the imposition of 
criminal penalties. The court directed its attention to "anti-
sedition statutes, criminal anarehy laws, criminal syndicalist 
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laws, etc." No reference is made to the many so-called loyalty 
oath cases considered by the court in recent years. The court's 
intention not to ehange or modify the established law in those 
cases by what it said in the Nelson ease appears from its 
later opinion in Slochowe1· v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 
551 [76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692], deeided on April 9, 1956, 
one week after the eourt 's deeision in the Nelson ease. In 
speaking of balaneing the state's interest in the loyalty of 
ecrtain persons against the interests of those persons in their 
individuals rights, the eourt referred by way of illustration to 
its earlier deeisions in Adler v. Board of Education, supra, 
342 U.S. 485, and Garner v. Board of Public W arks of Los 
Angeles, sup1·a, 341 U.S. 716, 720. In both of those eases 
the eourt upheld the validity of state legislation whieh re-
quired, as a condition to acquiring or maintaining partieular 
privileges or rights by certain persons, that sueh persons re-
frain from advoeating the violent overthrow of our form of 
government. If in the present case the eonstitutional amrnd-
ment and implementing legislation infringe upon an area 
oceupied exelusively by Congress within the scope of the 
decision in the Nelson ease, eertainly the same eonelusion 
would be true of the enaetments involved in the Garner and 
Adler cases and the court would not have approved those 
deeisions in the Sloehower case. Furthermore, in any con-
sideration of the possible application of the Nelson case to 
the ease at bar, it would be unreasonable to conclude that 
the federal government intends to or has oecupied the field 
of state taxation. 
:F'inally, it should be observed that we are here dealing 
with questions of law and not with any questions of faet with 
referenee to the aetivities of the plaintiff organization. As 
hereinbefore noted, there is attaehed to the protest filed with 
the payment of the tax sought to be recovered a statement 
of the prineiples and objeetives of the plaintiff in furtherance 
of its religious aetivities. Those principles and doctrines 
refleet the high ideals of morality and personal conduct whieh 
are basic in the foundation of our system of government, 
both state and national. They are noble in purpose and 
inspirational in tone. It is inconceivable that an organization 
aetuated by the doctrinal pronouncements there deelared 
would knowingly harbor within itself any person or gronp of 
persons who would engage in the subversive activities referred 
to in seetion 19 of artiele XX. It is taken for granted that 
an organization aetuated by those high purposes and ideals 
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would be the first to champion the efforts of the state to 
protect itself against the destruction of those guarantees 
which are necessary to the existence of the plaintiff and to 
the preservation of the fundamental rights which it otherwise 
enjoys. But an assumed fact of the nonexistence of subver-
sion in an organization is not enough. The law demands the 
ascertainment of that fact for purposes of taxation and sec-
tion 32 requires the cooperation of the plaintiff in establish-
ing it. 
No good reason has been advanced why churches as well 
as all of the many other organizations seeking exemption 
from taxation should not be required to comply with the law 
of the state providing for assistance to the county assessors 
in the discharge of their duties to ascertain the facts which 
would justify the exemption. By the plaintiff's failure and 
refusal to allege that it has complied with the law which 
would enable it to qualify for the exemption the complaint 
fails to state a cause of action. 'l'he demurrer was therefore 
properly sustained without leave to amend. 
'l'he judgment is affirmed. 
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, ,J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
Section 19 of article XX of the California Constitution and 
section 32 of the Revenue and Taxation Code unjustifiably 
restrict free speech. Section 19 in effect imposes a penalty in 
the form of withholding a tax exemption upon any person 
or organization that chooses to speak in a certain manner, 
namely, by advocating overthrow of the federal or state gov-
ernments by force or support of a foreign government against 
the United States in event of hostilities. Section 32 provides 
a special method of enforcing these restrictions as to certain 
tax exemptions. A person claiming one of these exemptions 
must make a declaration that he does not advocate the con-
duct specified in section 19. In effect the provisions impose a 
tax measured by the exemptions allowed to others not only 
upon those who advocate overthrow of the government by 
force or support of a foreign government in event of hostili-
ties, but also upon those who do not advocate such conduct 
but refuse to declare that they do not. 
A restraint on free speech is not less a restraint when it 
is imposed indirectly through withholding a privilege rather 
than directly through taxation, fine, or imprisonment. This 
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court so held in Danskin v. San Diego Unifiecl Sch. Dist., 
28 Cal.2d 536, 547-548 [171 P.2d 885], involving a com-
parable privilege, the n:-:e of school buildings for public 
meetings. "It is true that the state need not open the doors 
of a school building as a forum and may at any time choose to 
close them. Once it opens the doors, however, it eannot 
demand tickets of admission in the form of convietions and 
affiliations that it deems aeceptable .... 'l'hc Yery purpose 
of a forum is the interchange of irleas, and that purpose ean-
not be frustrated by a eenson;hip that >vould label eertain con-
victions and affiliations suspeet, denying the pri\'ilPge of 
assembly to those who hold them, but granting it to those 
whose convictions and affiliations happen to be acceptable 
and in effect amplifying their privilege by makiug it a special 
one. In the competitive struggle of ideas for acceptam~e they 
would have a great strategic advantage in making themselves 
known and heard in a forum where the competition had been 
diminished by censorship, and their very freedom would in-
tensify the suppression of those condemned to silenee. It is 
not for the state to control the influence of a pnblie forum 
by censoring the ideas, the proponents, or the audiem~e; if it 
could, that freedom which is the life of a democratic assembly 
would be stilled. And the dulling rffects of censorship on 
a community are more to be feared than the quickening influ-
ence of a live interchange of ideas.'' 
The tax exemptions in question are likewise comparable to 
the privilege of using the mails at less than eost. In H anne-
gan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 156 [6G S.Ct. 4G6, 90 hEd. 
586], the court declared that, "grave constitutional questions 
are immediately raised once it is said that the use of the mails 
is a privilege which may be extende(1 or withheld on any 
grounds whatsoever .... Under that view the second-class 
rate could be granted on condition that certain economic or 
political ideas not be disseminated. 'l'hc provisions of the 
[statute] ... >vould have to be far more explicit for us to 
assume that Congress made such a radical departure from our 
traditions and undertook to clothe the PostmastPr General 
with the power to supervise the tastes of the reading puhlic of 
the country." The dissent of l\Ir. Justice Brandeis in Unit eel 
States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Dcmocratie Pnblishin.r; Co. v. 
Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 4:30-431 [41 S.Ct. 352, 65 hEd. 704], 
invoked in the Esquire case, rrasoned that, ''Congress may 
not through its postal police power put limitations upon the 
freedom of the press which if directly attempted would be 
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unconstitutional. This court also stated in Ex parte Jackson 
that 'Liberty of circulating is as essential to that freedom 
as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the circulation, the 
publication would be of little valne.' It is argued that 
although a newspaper is barred from the second-class mail, 
liberty of circulation i;;; not dC>nied, because the first and third-
class mail and also other means of transportation are left 
open to a publislwr. Constitutional rights should not be 
frittered a\Yay by argnments so tC>chnical and unsubstantial. 
'The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its 
inhibition was leveled at the thing, not the name.' ( C11mmings 
v. 1J1issonri, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 277, 325 [18 L.Ed. 356].) The 
Government, might, of course, decline altogether to distribute 
newspapers; or it might decline to carry any at less than the 
cost of the service; and it would not thereby abridge the 
freedom of the press, since to all papers other means of trans-
portation would be left open. But to carry newspapers gen-
erally at a sixth of the cost of the service and to deny that 
seryicc to one paper of the same general character, because 
to the Postmaster General views therein expressed in the past 
seem illegal, would prove an effective censorship and abridge 
seriously freedom of expression.'' 
Although free speech may not be an absolute right, it must 
be jealously guarded. As the court stated in American Com-
mnnications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 412 [70 S.Ct. 674, 
94 I1.Ed. 925], the first amendment "requires that one be 
permitted to advocate what he will unless there is a clear and 
present danger that a substantial public evil will result there-
from.'' That test is still a valid one. It was not repudiated 
in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 
hEel. 1137]. The court was there concerned not to abolish 
the clear and present danger test bnt to bend it to the special 
situation of a critical time and the diabolic strategy of the 
Communist Party. As before, the key word in its solution 
vms danger: " 'In each case [courts J must ask whether the 
gravity of the "evil," discounted by its improbability, justi-
fies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the 
danger.' " (341 U.S. at 510.) There was evidence that the 
i!efr.ndants, members of the Communist Party, advocated over-
throw of the government by force and violence. The jury 
vYas instructed that it could not find them guilty under thr 
statute nnless it found that they had conspired with the intent 
that their advocacy "be of a rule or principle of action and 
by language reasonably and ordinarily calculated to incite 
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persons to such action, all with the intent to cause the over-
throw or destruction'' of the government by force. The jury 
had also to determine whether the defendants intended to 
overthrow the government ''as speedily as the circumstances 
would permit." Moreover, the court of appeals held that the 
record supported the conclusion that "the Communist Party 
is a highly disciplined organization, adept at infiltration into 
strategic positions, use of aliases, and double-meaning lan-
guage; that the Party is rigidly controlled; that Communists, 
unlike other political parties, tolerate no dissension from the 
policy laid down by the guiding forces, but that the approved 
program is slavishly followed by the members of the Party. 
" (341 U.S. at 498, 511-512.) 
It is essential in each case to inquire into the character of 
the speech to be restrained and the surrounding circumstances. 
The probability that advocacy will break out in action depends 
on the numbers, methods, and organization of the advocates. 
The state provisions in question penalize advocacy in a 
totally different context from that in the Dennis case. The 
penalty falls indiscriminately on all manner of advocacy, 
whether it be a call to action or mere theoretical prophecy 
that leaves the way open for counteradvocacy by others. More-
over, with regard to advocacy of support of a foreign govern-
ment, the state provisions penalize not only advocacy during 
actual hostilities but also advocacy during peacetime of action 
during hostilities that may occur, if at all, in the remote 
future. 
There is no evidence in the present case that plaintiff church 
or its members advocate the overthrow of the government by 
force or otherwise. There is no evidence that plaintiff church 
or any of the organizations seeking tax exemptions are infil-
trated by Communists or other disloyal persons, or that they 
are in any danger of such infiltration. The evidence is all 
to the contrary. It is baldly assumed that plaintiff church 
advocates the overthrow of the government by force because 
it refuses to declare that it does not. It is one thing for a 
court to sustain convictions after it has concluded following 
a full trial that it is dealing with an organization wielding the 
power of a centrally controlled international Communist move-
ment; it is quite another to deprive a church of a tax exemp-
tion on the ground that it will not declare that it does not 
advocate overthrow of the government. 
If it is unconstitutional to restrain plaintiff from advocat-
ing overthrow of the government, it is a fortiori uneonstitu-
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tional to require it to prove or declare that it does not 
advocate overthrow of the government. (See Dauskin v. San 
Diego Un·ified Sch. Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536, 548 [171 P.2d 885] .) 
Such a restraint is the more vicious because it penalizes not 
only those who advocate overthrow of the government but 
also those who do not but will not declare that they do not. 
There are some who refuse to make the required declaration, 
not because they advocate overthrow of the government, but 
because they conscientiously believe that the state has no right 
to inquire into matters so intimately touching political belief. 
Rightly or wrongly they fear that such an inquiry is the 
first step in censorship of unpopular ideas. Even in the face 
of a bona fide danger, the state has no power to embark on 
an unnecessary wholesale suppression of liberty. (See Butler 
v. Michigan, 25 U.S.L. Week 4165, 4166.) 
The majority opinion, however, invokes the rule that the 
government may attain a legitimate objective through means 
reasonably related thereto even though there is an incidental 
restraint on speech. Thus, in securing qualified and trust-
worthy employees for government service a loyalty oath may 
be required, not for the purpose of restraining speech, but 
as a means of selection. (Adler v. Board of Ed1wation, 342 
U.S. 485, 492 et seq. [72 S.Ct. 380, 96 L.Ed. 517, 27 A.L.R.2d 
472] ; Garner v. Board of Pnblic TV m·ks Los Angeles, 341 
U.S. 716, 720 et seq. [71 S.Ct. 909, 95 L.Ed. 1317]; Gerende v. 
Baltimm·e etc. Board of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 [71 S.Ct. 565, 
~)5 L.Ed. 745] ; Steinmetz v. California State Bd. of Education, 
44 Cal.2d 816 [285 P.2d 617]; Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 
676 [249 P.2d 267] .) Similarly, American Conmmnications 
Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 [70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925], 
held that in serking to keep interstate commerce free of politi-
c-al strikes, Congress may require labor officials to file non-
Communist affidavits as a condition to their unions' im·oking 
the jurisdiction of the National IJabor Relations Board. 
In such cases it is necessary to determine whether the provi-
sions that incidentally restrain speech are in fact reasonably 
related to the attainment of the governmental objective. In 
Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269 [70 N.W.2d 605], 
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 882 [76 S.Ct. 135, 100 L.Ed. 778], the 
Supreme Court of \Visconsin considered a federal statute that 
provided in effect that no housing unit constructed under the 
statute could be occupied by a member of an organization des-
ignated as subversive by the attorney general. Pursuant to 
this statute, the Milwaukee Housing Authority adopted a reso-
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lution that required its tenants to execute a certificate of non-
membership in the listed organizations. The court held the 
resolution unconstitutional, and after discussing the Douds 
case stated: "It is beyond our power to comprehend how 
the evil which mig"\lt result from leasing units in a federally 
aided housing project to tenants who are members of organi-
zations designated subversive by the Attorney General is in 
any way comparable in substantiality to that which would 
result to the general welfare through communists in control 
of labor organizations disrupting commerce by calling strikes 
to carry out Communist Party policy. This court deems the 
possible harm which might result in suppressing the freedoms 
of the First Amendment outweigh any threatened evil posed 
by the occupation by members of subversive organizations of 
units in federally aided housing projects." (270 Wis. at 287-
288.) In considering the same problem, the Supreme Court 
of Illinois pointed out that, ''The purpose of the Illinois 
Housing Authority Act is to eradicate slums and provide 
housing for persons of low-income class. [Citation.] It is 
evident that the exclusion of otherwise qualified persons solely 
because of membership in organizations designated as sub-
versive by the Attorney General has no tendency whatever to 
further such purpose." (Chicago Housing Authority v. 
Blackman, 4 Ill.2d 319 [122 N.E.2d 522, 526] .) 
In the present case the majority opinion thus states the 
governmental objective: "Encouragement to loyalty to our 
institutions and an incentive to defend one's country in the 
event of hostilities ... doctrines \vhich the state has plainly 
promulgated and intends to foster. It is the high purpose 
residing in its people that the state is attempting to en-
courage in its endeavor to protect itself against subversive 
infiltration. . . . Obviously a program of tax exemption 
designed to promote adherence to the principles of our govern-
ment but constrained to include within its bounty persons or 
organizations actively advocating subversion and the support 
of enemies in time of l10stilities, would be wholly without 
reason and result in its own defeat.'' 
The issue thus narrows to whether a state can properly 
restrain free speech in the interest of promoting what appears 
to be eminently right thinking. A state with such power 
becomes a monitor of thought to determine what is and what 
is not right thinking. Great as a state's police power is, 
however, the United States Supreme Court has yet to sanction 
its breaking into people's minds to make them orderly. In 
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holding that school children may not be compelled to salute 
the flag as a condition to attending public schools, the Supreme 
Com-t throng·h Mr .. fustiee ,Jaeb;on stated that, "To believe 
that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are 
voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine 
is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our insti-
tutions to free minds. \Ve ean have intellectual individualism 
and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional 
minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal 
attitudes. ·when they are so harmless to others or to the 
State as those we deal with here, the price is not too great. 
But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not 
matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The 
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that 
touch the heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed 
star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force 
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If 
there are any circumstances which permit an exception, thry 
do not now occur to us." (West Virginia Board of Education 
v. Bar-nette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-642 [63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 
1628, 147 A.L.R. 674] .) 
Advocacy does not occur in an intellectual vacuum. Usually 
it auswers or challenges other advocacy. As Mr. Justice Frank-
furter aptly stated in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 
549-550 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137]: "Of course no 
government can recognize a 'right' of revolution, or a 'right' 
to incite revolution if the incitement has no other purpose 
or effect. But speech is seldom restricted to a single purpose, 
and its effects may be manifold. .A public interest is not 
wanting in granting freedom to speak their minds even to 
those who advocate the overthrow of the Government by force. 
For, as the evidence in this case abundantly illustrates, cou-
pled >Yith such advocacy is criticism of defects in our society. 
Criticism is the spur to reform; and Burke's admonition that 
a healthy society must reform in order to conserve has not lost 
its force. Astute observers have remarked that one of the 
characteristics of the American Republic is indifference to 
fundamental criticism. Bryce, The American Commonwealth, 
c. 84. It is a commonplace that there may be a grain of 
truth in the most uncouth doctrine, however false and repel-
lant the balance may be. Suppressing advocates of overthrow 
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inevitably will also silence critics who do not advocate over-
throw but fear that their criticism may be so construed. No 
matter how clear we may be that the defendants now before 
us are preparing to overthrow our Government at the propi-
tious moment, it is self-delusion to think that we can punish 
them for their advocacy without adding to the risks run by 
loyal citizens who honestly believe in some of the reforms 
these defendants advance. It is a sobering fact that in sus-
taining the convictions before us we can hardly escape restric-
tion on the interchange of ideas.'' 
Section 32 impedes not only advocacy itself but discussion 
short of advocacy that may be of the utmost value. As Mr. 
Justice Jackson pointed out in the Dennis case, ''Of course, 
it is not always easy to distinguish teaching or advocacy in 
the sense of incitement from teaching or advocacy in the sense 
of exposition or explanation," and Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
recognized that, "there is no divining rod by which we may 
locate 'advocacy.' Exposition of ideas readily merges into 
advocacy." ( 341 U.S. at 545, 572.) Yet section 32 compels 
the cautious to forego discussion for fear they will overstep 
the line that no divining rod can locate. 
Errors in thought or expression are best counteracted by 
deeper thought and more cogent expression. Only through 
free discussion can subversive doctrines be understood and 
effectively combatted. '' 'The interest, which [the First 
Amendment] guards, and which gives it its importance, pre-
supposes that there are no orthodoxies-religious, political, 
economic, or scientific-which are immune from debate and 
dispute. Back of that is the assumption-itself an orthodoxy, 
and the one permissible exception-that truth will be most 
likely to emerge, if no limitations are imposed upon utterances 
that can with any plausibility be regarded as efforts to present 
grounds for accepting or rejecting propositions whose truth 
the utterer asserts, or denies.' ... In the last analysis it is 
on the validity of this faith that our national security is 
staked." (Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Dennis v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 550 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137] .) 
The majority opinion in the present case goes far beyond 
any United States Supreme Court decision in upholding legis-
lation that restricts the citizen's right to speak freely. Section 
19 of article XX, implemented by section 32 of the Revenue 
and Taxation Code, arbitrarily assumes that those who seek 
tax exemptions advocate overthrow of the government unless 
they declare otherwise. The provisions infringe the right to 
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engage in such advocacy without reference to its seriousness, 
inhibit free discussion short of advocacy, and penalize the 
belief that the government has no right to require professions 
of innocence in the absence of proof of guilt. A law with such 
consequences cannot stand in the face of the constitutional 
guarantees. 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I approach the consideration of this case with a profound 
consciousness that the problems involved may have a direct 
impact upon the stability of our state and federal govern-
ments. Evidently those who enacted the legislation here in-
volved felt that it was necessary to preserve the status quo 
of those governments. On the other hand the plaintiff chal-
lenges the enactments as an invasion of fundamental consti-
tutional guarantees to it and other religious institutions. We 
are, therefore, at the outset, faced with the problem as to what 
:,;auctions, in the way of pledges of fealty and loyalty, our 
government may exact from a taxpayer in order to qualify 
the latter for a tax exemption granted to all in the same class. 
The solution of this problem depends upon our interpretation 
and application of the constitutional guarantees relied upon 
by plaintiff as barriers against such sanctions. 
It must be remembered that while our government was 
''conceived in liberty,'' it was born in revolution. The Decla-
ration of Independence was the antithesis of a pledge of 
allegiance or loyalty to the British government of which the 
then American colonists were a part. This memorable docu-
ment epitomized the concept of its framers of the objects and 
purposes of government and the right of the people to change 
it by force if necessary. It declared: "\Ve hold these truths 
to be self-evident: That all men are created equal; that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments arc insti-
tuted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent 
of the governed; that whenever any form of government 
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people 
to alter or to abolish it and to institute new government, laying 
its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers 
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
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safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, ·will dictate that 
governments long established should not be changed for light 
and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath 
shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils 
are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms 
to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses 
and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces 
a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their 
right, it is their duty, to throw off such government and to 
provide new guards for their future security. Such has been 
the patient sufferance of these colonies; and such is now the 
necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems 
of government." 
The events which followed the adoption of the Declaration 
of Independence by the Continental Congress on July 4, 1776, 
are well known to every student of American history. These 
events culminated in the Constitutional Convention at Phila-
delphia during the summer of 1787 where the Constitution 
of the United States was drafted. Many of the delegates 
at the Constitutional Convention had been members of the 
Continental Congress which had adopted the Declaration of 
Independence. They were revolutionists in the truest and 
most dignified sense. It should be remembered that the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the 
United States were prepared by a group of men who had en-
dured tyranny under a monarchial form of government for 
over three generations. They were the leaders in the struggle 
which overthrew that government and they sought to establish 
a government of the people, by the people, and for the people, 
which would derive its just powers from the consent of the 
governed. They sought to establish justice, ensure domestic 
tranquility, promote the general welfare, provide for the 
common defense and secure the blessings of liberty to them-
selves and their posterity-a government which would govern 
without tyranny and without oppression and which would 
guarantee to the governed all of the liberty that a free people 
in a homogenous society could enjoy. 
The great liberality accorded to the guarantees of freedom 
of speech and press by those at the head of our government 
during its formative period is exemplified by the following 
statement in the First Inaugural Address of President Thomas 
Jefferson. He there declared : "If there be any among us who 
would wish to dissolve this union or change its republican 
form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety 
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with which error of opinion may be tolerated ·where reason 
is left free to combat it.'' This same concept was again 
expressed by Mr. Jefferson in his letter to Benjamin Rush in 
these words: "I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal 
hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of 
man." This concept was more recently depicted by Mr. Jus-
tice Brandeis in Whitney v. Califm·nia, 274 U.S. 357 [47 S.Ct. 
641, 71 L.Ed. 1095], in words that will forever be a part of 
our American heritage. ''Those who won our independence 
I.Jy revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political 
change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To 
courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in tlle power of 
free and fearless reasoning applied .through the process of 
popular government, no danger flowing from free speech can 
be deemed clear and present unless the incidence of the evil 
apprehended is so imminent that it may be fatal before there 
is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose 
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the 
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied 
is more speech, not enforced silence.'' 
Over a century and a half has elapsed since the above quoted 
utterances of Thomas J effcrson. Our government has with-
stood one major revolution and several minor armed rebellions 
but the fundamental basic concept of civil liberties embraced 
within the Bill of Rights has remained unimpaired. 
It is worthy of note that the framers of the Constitution of 
the United States saw fit to exact of the person who assumed 
the office of President a very simple oath which reads as 
follows: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faith-
fully execute the office of President of the United States, and 
will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend 
the Constitution of the United States.'' (U.S. Const., art. II, 
§ 1.) This is the only oath mentioned in the Constitution. 
Notwithstanding the great trust reposed in and power con-
ferred upon the President of the United States by the Consti-
tution and laws enacted by Congress, no other oath or pledge 
of loyalty may be exacted of him. Nevertheless no president 
has ever been suspected of disloyalty. It may be said with 
eonfidence that history has demonstrated the wisdom of the 
framers of the Constitution in drafting an oath so simple and 
yet so effective that it has endured the tests of time and 
trial. The past at least is secure. But such an oath was not 
deemed sufficient to insure the loyalty and fealty of the Vice 
President, members of Congress and other officials of our 
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national government. Although no other official of our govern-
ment possesses the po>ver or authority of the President, they 
are required to take an oath much more exacting as it amounts 
to a pledge of allegiance. This oath is contained in an act of 
Congress and is as follows : ''I do solemnly swear (or affirm) 
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will 
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this 
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose 
of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the 
duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me 
God.'' (U.S. Code, title V, § 16, pp. 10-11, U.S.C. 1952 ed., 
titles 1-14.) I find no fault with this oath and recognize the 
propriety of exacting such an oath from one who assumes an 
official position with our government. It will be observed, 
however, that neither of the above quoted oaths has the slight-
est resemblance to the test oath here involved. In comment-
ing on such an oath Dr. Carl Joachim Friedrich, Professor 
of Government, of Harvard University had the following to 
say: "It is depressing to realize that the oath has always 
cropped up as a political device when the political order was 
crumbling. In the period of religious dissensions the oath of 
allegiance made its appearance in England as an instrument 
of intolerance and, a little later, of royal oppression. James 
Stuart, the tiresome pedant on the throne, sought refuge in 
an oath required of all ministers and the like (most teaching 
then being religious). At that time the imperial pretensions 
of the 'reformed' papacy, the right of the Pope claimed by 
the Jesuits to absolve the subjects of an heretical king from 
their allegiance, made the king desirous of testing the loyalty 
of his more influential subjects. Yet not many years later 
his son's head rolled in to the sand. 
"Following that, Oliver Cromwell in his desperate efforts 
to find a legitimate basis for his dictatorial regime, demanded 
an oath preceding the election of parliament in 1653 that no 
one participating in the election would allow the constitution 
'as settled in one person and parliament' to be disturbed. But 
Cromwell died and the oath was forgotten. The rupture which 
the oath was supposed to heal did not disappear until tolera-
tion and a liberal, truly constitutional government had taught 
people how Catholic and Protestant, how parliamentarian and 
authoritarian, how "Whig and Tory could live peaceably to-
gether, with no one requiring the other to swear oaths which 
were either unnecessary or ineffectual. 
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"And where have oaths appeared in our own day 1 In 
Fascist Italy and in Nazi Germany. In both of these countries 
the dictators have promulgated requirements according to 
which the teachers and professors have to swear an oath of 
allegiance to the Duce, the Leader. But what, one may ask, 
was the object of demanding such a declaration from men who 
every day were obliged to mold their words and their teachings 
to the Fascist creed? The purpose was to humiliate or to 
destroy them. There were plenty of men who were known to 
the students as non-Fascists, non-Nazis. If they could be 
forced into swearing their allegiance to the official creed, they 
were morally discredited, they were shown to be trimmers. 
What is more, the man of integrity and of faith is the really 
dangerous enemy. He would not consent. He would protest. 
Gaetano Salvemini, now teaching at Harvard, is such a man. 
He knew the game of Mussolini and he left.'' (Article en-
titled "Teacher's Oaths," published in the January, 1936 
issue of Harper's, vol. 172 at p. 171.) 
At this point, I cannot refrain from quoting the words of 
warning contained in the powerful concurring opinion of Mr. 
Justice Black in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 [73 
S.Ct. 215, 97 I.~.Ed. 216] : "History indicates that individual 
liberty is intermittently subjected to extraordinary perils .... 
The first years of our Republic marked such a period. Enforce-
ment of the Alien and Sedition Laws by zealous patriots who 
feared ideas made it highly dangerous for people to think, 
speak, or write critically about government, its agents, or its 
policies, either foreign or domestic. Our constitutional liber-
ties survived the ordeal of this regrettable period because there 
were influential men and powerful organized groups bold 
rnough to champion the undilutrd right of individuals to 
publish and argue for their beliefs however unorthodox or 
loathsome. Today, however, few people and organizations of 
power and influence argue that unpopular advocacy has this 
same wholly unqualified immunity from governmental inter-
ference. For this and other reasons the present period of 
fear seems more ominously dangerous to speech and press 
than was that of the Alien and Sedition Laws. Suppressive 
laws and practices are the fashion. The Oklahoma oath 
statute is but one manifestation of a national network of laws 
aimed at coercing and controlling the minds of men. Test 
oaths are notorious tools of tyranny. When used to shackle 
the mind they are, or at least they should be, unspeakably 
odi&us to a free people. Test oaths are made still more danger-
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ous when combined with bills of attainder which like this 
Oklahoma statute impose pains and penalties for past lawful 
associations and utterances. 
''. . . Our own free society should never forget that laws 
which stigmatize and penalize thought and speech of the 
unorthodox have a way of reaching, ensnaring and silencing 
many more people than at first intended. We m1tst have 
ft·ecdorn of speech fm· all or we will in the long ntn have it 
for none but the cringing and the craven. And I cannot too 
often repeat my belief that the right to speak on matters of 
public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly 
lost." (Emphasis added.) 
History is replete with accounts of the many stratagems 
ereated by tyrants to Yiolate the individual's liberty. But it 
is also replete with accounts of man's constant warfare against 
these devices and victories won by courageous judges, legis-
lators, administrators, lawyers, and citizens. 
ln 1787, the founders of this nation assumed that they had 
settled these matters for all time when they drew upon the 
lessons of history and wrote a Bill of Rights to assure the 
individual permanent freedom from official tyranny, and the 
right freely to participate in the process of self-government. 
''Such constitutional limitations arise from grievances, real 
or fancied, which their makers have suffered, and should go 
par·i passn with the supposed evil. They withstand the winds 
of logic by the depth and toughness of their roots in the past. 
Nor should we forget that what seems fair enough against a 
squalid huckster of bad liquor may take on a very different 
face, if used by a government determined to suppress political 
opposition under the guise of sedition.'' (Learned Hand, J., 
in United States v. Kirschenblatt ( C.C.A.2d), 16 F.2d 202, 
203 [51 A.L.R. 416] .) 
''These specific grievances and the safeguards against their 
recurrence were not defined by the Constitution. They were 
defined by history. Their meaning was so settled by history 
that definition was superfluous .... 'Upon this point a page 
of history is worth a volume of logic.' New York Tntst Co. v. 
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 [ 41 S. Ct. 506, 65 L.Ed. 963, 16 
A.L.R. 660]." (Frankfurter, .J., United States v. Lovett 
(1945), 328 U.S. 303,321.323 [66 S.Ct.l073, 90 L.Ed. 1252].) 
"It would not be possible to add to the emphasis with which 
the framers of our Constitution and this court (in Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616 [6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746], in 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 [34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 
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652, lJ.R.A. 1915B , and in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 P.S. :38:1 [ 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 hEel. 319, 24 
A.hR 14261) have deelared the importanee to political liberty 
and to the welfare of our eonntry of the due observance of 
the rights guaranteed under the Constitution by these two 
amendments. The effect of the decisions cited is: That such 
rights are declared to be indispensable to the 'full enjoyment 
oE personal seeurity, personal liberty, and private property;' 
that they are to be regarded as of the very essence of consti-
tutional liberty; and that the g·naranty of them is as important 
and as imperative as are the guaranties to the other funda-
mental rights of the individual citizen-the right to trial by 
jury, to the \Vrit of habeas corpus, and to due process of law. 
It has been repeatedly decided that these Amendments should 
receive a liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy en-
croachment upon or 'gradual depreeiation' of the rights se-
cured by them, by impereeptible practiee of courts, or by 
well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive offi-
cers." ( Goulcd v. United States (1920), 255 U.S. 298, 303 
[41 S.Ct. 261, 65 I"'.Ed. 647], Clarke, J.) (Emphasis sup-
plied.) Sec also: Brandeis, ,J. dissenting, Olrnsfcacl v. United 
States (1927), 277 U.S. 438, 476, 478 [48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 
944, 66 A.LR. 376), and .Jones v. Securities & Exch. Com. 
(1935), 298 U.S. 1, 28 [56 S.Ct. 654, 80 L.Ed. 1015]. 
''If there is one fixed star in our Constitutional constella-
tion, it is that no offieial, high OJ' petty, ean prescribe what 
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion or force c?:tizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein." (,Jackson, J., in West ViJ'(Jinia State 
Board of Ed11cation v. Barnette (1943), 319 U.S. 624, 642 
[63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 I.1.Ed. 1628, 147 A.I.1.R. 674] .) (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
rrhe story of the rise and fall of the oath ex-officio needs 
to be retold. It will be reealled that the early 1200's were 
marked by the adoption of this proeednral deviee in the 
ecelcsiastical courts. In this period the inquisitional oath 
began to take the place of the trial by eompurgation oaths in 
the ecclesiastic-al courts. The compurgation trials c-onducted 
with the device of "oath helpers" had become little better 
than a farc·e. The new method of the oath ex-officio was one 
which pledged the accused to answer truly and was followed 
by a rational process of judicial probing by questions on the 
speeific details of the affair. Jn a footnote by John H. Wig-
more in 15 Harvard I1aw Review 615, it is stated that by the 
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middle of the 13th century "the new oath became the cus-
tomary instrument in the papal inquisition of heresy; which, 
indeed, owed its effectiveness largely to the new methods.'' 
I_jiberals in the church courts insisted that the oath could 
only be imposed if the court had a rational hypothesis for 
proceeding against the suspect. Such rational hypothesis 
could either be fama p1tblica or clamosa insinnatio. However, 
this was too mild for those who wanted a more vigorous pursuit 
of heretics and schismatics, and they finally prevailed in estab-
lishing the doctrine that the oath could be imposed by the 
church official ex-officio without any antecedent foundation. 
'l'his extreme position, however, directly resulted in the down-
fall of the power of the ecclesiastical courts because of the 
public indignation it aroused. 
The ordinary course of trial by the Inquisition was this. 
A man would be reported to the inquisitor as of ill-repute for 
heresy, or his name would occur in the confessions of some 
other prisoners. A secret inquisition would be made and 
all accessible evidence against him would be collected. When 
the mass of surmises and gossip, exaggerated and distorted by 
the natural fear of the witnesses, eager to save themselves 
from the suspicion of favoring heretics, grew sufficient for 
action, the blow would fall. The accused was then prejudged. 
He >vas assumed to be guilty, or he would not have been put 
on trial, and virtually his only mode of escape was by 
confessing the charges against him, abjuring heresy, and 
accepting whatever punishment might be imposed on him in 
the shape of penance. Persistent denial of guilt and assertion 
of orthodoxy, when there was evidence against him, rendered 
him an impenitent, obstinate heretic, to be abandoned to the 
secular arm and consigned to the state. (See Henry Charles 
Lea, A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages, I, p. 
407.) 
However, the English people early registered their resist-
ance to general inquisitorial methods and their attendant 
abuses. A statute passed in 1360 in the reign of Edward III, 
provided, "that all general inquiries before this time granted 
within any seignories, for the mischiefs and oppression which 
have been done to the people by such inquiries, shall utterly 
cease and be repealed." ( 34 Edw. III, ch. 1.) 
But in 1583 the Court of High Commission in Causes 
Ecclesiastical, under the leadership of Archbishop Whitgift, 
started a crusade against heresy wherever it could be found, 
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examining suspected persons under oath in most extreme 
ex-officio style. 
In 1609 Sir Edward Coke, as Chief Justice of Common 
Pleas, granted prohibition against the High Court of Ecclesi-
astical Causes in Edward's case. (13 Rep. 9.) Edward had 
been charged with libel and the church court put him under 
the ex-officio oath to compel him to state his meaning of the 
libelous words he was accused of uttering. The common law 
court took jurisdiction away from the church court upon the 
ground, among others, that ''in cases where a man is to be 
examined upon his oath, he ought to be examined upon acts 
or words, and not of the intentions or thought of his heart; 
and if any man should be examined upon his oath of the 
opinion he holdeth concerning any point of religion, he is not 
bound to answer the same.'' 
But the oath ex-officio persisted and the Court of the Star 
Chamber began during James' reign to use the ex-officio oath 
in stamping out sedition. Here the common law courts were 
powerless to prevent employment of the oath procedure be-
cause they lacked jurisdiction over the Court of the Star 
Chamber. 
In 1639 the Court of the Star Chamber examined John 
Lilburn, "Freeborn John," an opponent of the Stuarts. on a 
charge of printing or importing certain heretical and seditious 
books. Lilburn refused to answer questions ''concerning other 
men, to insnare me, and to get further matter against me.'' 
The Council of the Star Chamber condemned him to be 
whipped and pilloried for his "boldness in refusing to take 
a legal oath," without which many offenses might go "undis-
covered and unpunished." (See 3 How. State Trials 1315, 
et seq.) 
The whip that lashed "Freeborn John" smashed the Court 
of the Star Chamber as well. In July, 1641, Parliament abol-
ished the Court of the Star Chamber, the Court of High Com-
mission for Ecclesiastical Causes, and provided by statute 
that no ecclesiastical court could thereafter administer an 
ex-offic1:o oath on penal matters. In 1645 the House of Lords 
set aside Lilburn's sentence and in 1648 Lilburn was granted 
£3000 reparation for the whipping which he had received. 
Meanwhile, the scene of struggle against oaths ex-offic1:o 1vas 
carried to colonial America. The story is well told by R. 
Carter Pittman in 21 Virginia Law Rev. 763 from which the 
following quotations are taken: 
"The settlement of the English colonials in the new world 
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took place at a time in English History when opposition 
to the ex-officio oath of the ecdesiastieal courts \vas most pro-
nounced, and at the period when the insistence upon the 
privilege against self-incrimination in the courts of common 
law had begun to have decided effect. . . . The e.r-officio oath, 
as employed in the ecclesiastical courts, which regulated the 
most intimate details of men's daily life, and more particularly 
by the Court of High Commission, was possibly the most 
hated instrument employed to create the unhappy plight of 
these Puritans and Separatists. . . . 
"About getting out of England there was much 'red tape' 
and it consisted in the most part of taking oaths-the oath of 
Supremacy and the oath of Allegiance, etc. For days and 
weeks thousands waited aboard ship in the river Thames until 
this oath ordeal was over and after that they were forced with 
a refined cruelty to say the prayers in the Anglican prayer 
books twice a day at sea .... " 
The trial of Mrs. Ann Hutchinson before Governor ·win-
throp of Massachusetts in the year 1637 was recalled by Mr. 
,Justice Black in .Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 [67 S.Ct. 
1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223], when he commented at 
page 88: 
"1\Irs. Hutchinson was tried, if trial it can be called, for 
holding unorthodox religious views. PeoplP with a consuming 
belief that their religious convictions must be forced on others 
rarely ever believe that the unorthodox have any rights which 
should or can be rightfully respected. As a result of her trial 
and compelled admissions, Mrs. Hutchinson was found guilty 
of unorthodoxy and banished from Massachusetts. The lamen-
table experience of Mrs. Hutchinson and others, contributed 
to the over-whelming sentiment that demanded adoption of 
the Constitutional Bill of Rights. The founders of this Gov-
ernment wanted no more such 'trials' and punishments as 
Mrs. Hutchinson had to undergo. They wanted to erect bar-
riers that would bar legislators from passing laws that en-
croached on the domain of belief, and that would, among other 
things, strip courts and alltJnblie officers o.f a power to compel 
people to testify against themselves." (Emphasis supplied.) 
But the ingenuity of those who would use the oath against 
the unorthodox was undaunted. 
See Harr'ison v. Evans, 1 Eng-lish Reports, 1437, decided by 
the House of I .. ords in 1767. Evans was a Protestant Dissenter 
and this fact \YaS known to the r .. ord :Mayor of London. 
Nevertheless, the Mayor appointed Evans to fill a vacancy as 
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sheriff, despite the existence of an act providing that no 
person should be admitted to any office who had not, within 
the twelve preceding months ''received the sacrament of the 
Lord's Supper aecording to the rites of the Church of 
England." Because of this statute Evans could not take the 
oath of office or assume it, and he was assessed for a statutory 
penalty of £600 which was made applicable to any citizen who 
refused to assume an office after being appointed thereto. 
The House of Lords, a 6 to 1 vote, ruled with the dissent-
ing Evans, overturned the judgments of the lower courts and 
returned to him his £600. 
"Test oaths, designed to impose civil disabilities upon men 
for their beliefs rather than for unlawful conduct were an 
abomination to the founders of this nation. This feeling was 
made manifest in Article VI of the Constitution which pro-
vides that no religious test shall e·vcr be required as a qttalifi-
cation to any office or public trust under the United States." 
(Black, J., dissenting In re Summers (1945), 325 U.S. 561, 
576 [65 S.Ct. 1807, 89 L.Ed. 1795].) (Emphasis supplied.) 
"No purpose in ratifying the Bill of Rights was clearer 
than that of securing for the people of the United States much 
greater freedom of religion, expression, assembly, and petition 
than the people of Great Britain had ever enjoyed. It cannot 
be denied, for example, that the rcl1:giou.s test oath or the 
restrictions upon assembly then prevalent in England would 
have been regarded as measures which the Constitution pro-
hibited the American Congress from passing." (Emphasis 
supplied.) (Bridges v. California (1941), 314 U.S. 252 at 
265 [62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346] .) 
It is revealing to note that test oaths and the struggle 
against them arose at a time when the division between 
church and state was in its early stages, when the separation 
was far from complete. 'rhe immunity from compulsory dis-
closure which ultimately developed affected not only the right 
of the individual to worship as he pleased but also his right, 
notwithstanding his place or mode of worship, to hold political 
office. The protection accorded religious belief developed hand 
in hand with nonsectarianism in government. 
This policy has been recognized in the United States. While 
the original purpose behind the abolition of the test oath may 
have been to further religious liberty, the effect has been 
to extend political liberty. The following statement is illus-
trative: ''This conjunction of liberties is not peculiar to 
religious aetivity and institutions alone. The First Amendment 
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gives freedom of mind the same security as freedom of con-
science. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 [ 45 
S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070]. Great secular causes, with small 
ones, are guarded. The grievances for redress of which the 
right of petition was insured, and with it the right of assembly, 
are not solely religious or political ones. And the rights of 
free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of 
human interest." (Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 
[65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430].) 
The California 1897 Direct Primary Act permitted political 
parties to require persons, as a condition of voting at the 
primary, to give an oath that they would thereafter support 
the nominees of that party. That statute was declared uncon-
stitutional and the Supreme Court, in Spier v. Baker (1898), 
120 Cal. 370, said at page 379 [52 P. 659, 41 L.R.A. 196] : 
''. . . And the moment you recognize the existence of power 
in the legislature to create tests in these primary elections, 
you recognize the right of the legislature to create any test 
which to that body may seem proper. While the test pre-
scribed in this act may be said to be a most reasonable one, 
yet the right to make it carries with it the right to make 
tests most unreasonable. If the power rests in the legislature 
to create a test, then the power is found in a Democratic 
legislature to make the test at a primary election a belief in 
the free coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one, and 
the same power is found in a Republican legislature to make 
the test a belief in the protective tariff. If such a power may 
be sustained under the constitution, then the life and death of 
political parties are held in the hollow of the hand by a state 
legislature.'' 
In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 [65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 
430], the same thought is expressed: ''But it cannot be the 
duty, because it is not the right of the state to protect the 
public against false doctrine. The very purpose of the First 
Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a 
guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, 
speech, and religion. In this field every person m7tst be his 
own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not 
tntst any government to separate the true from the false for 
us." (Emphasis supplied.) 
In the light of the foregoing discussion, let us consider 
the attacks made by plaintiff upon the oath here required. 
It is contended, with merit, that the oath here is unconstitu-
tional in that it violates the equal protection clauses of both 
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the federal and state Constitutions and that it also violates 
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
Section 32 makes an exception insofar as the householder's 
$100 exemption on personal property is concerned. While it 
cannot be denied that the Legislature in its wisdom may 
classify in order that certain evils may be avoided in the 
future, such classification must bear a reasonable relation to 
the evil to be avoided. TherB is here no reasonable classifica-
tion when the evil to be avoided is considered. There is no 
evidence that any of the churches or veterans here involved 
advocated, or intended to advocate, the forbidden political 
philosophy. The constitutional amendment and section 32 
appear to be a sort of shotgun attempt on the part of the 
Legislature to hit an undefined object. In other words, there 
is no relation between the object to be achieved and the tactics 
taken to achieve it. A statement made in the majority opinion 
clearly shows the fallacy in the entire affair. That statement 
reads as follows: ''By its enactment [section 19 of article 
XX] the people of the state declared the public policy of 
withholding from the owners of property in this state who 
engage in the prohibited activities the benefits of tax exemp-
tion. The denounced activities are criminal offenses under 
state law (Stats. 1919, p. 281), and the act of Congress 
known as the Smith Act (54 Stat. 670) makes it unlawful to 
advocate the overthrow of the government by force and vio-
lence." It should be emphatically stated and understood 
that not one of the churches or veterans here involved has 
been so much as accused of subversive activities. But 
through their refusal to take the unconstitutional (as I 
believe) oath, they are penalized in advance for some-
thing they have not done and will, in all probability, never 
do. By the majority opinion we are informed that the 
reason for the oath is to protect state revenues from impair-
ment by those who would seek to destroy it by unlawful 
means. An entirely different situation would be presented had 
any of those involved sought to destroy the state, but here only 
future highly problematical activity is forsworn although the 
tax is levied for past ownership of property to which the ex-
emption was applicable. Just why charitable institutions are 
singled out as presenting the greatest danger to this country 
in time of peace or war is not made clear in the majority 
opinion. It is Hornbook law that legislation classifying cer-
tain groups for corrective purposes must bear a reasonable 
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relationship to the object to be achieved. Churches would, 
indeed, seem to me to be the least likely subjects of classifica-
tion for legislative measurrs to correct thr evil thought to 
exist. Veterans, also, are those who have risked their lives 
or have been willing to risk them to uphold the ideals for 
\Yhich this country stands. 'l'he exemptions were granted, 
in the first im;tance, so that religions work might be carried 
on with the least amount of tax burden possible to the end 
that the money saved thereby might be used to promote the 
general ·welfare; in the second instance, to Yeterans because 
they gave up homes, families and positions to promote the 
general \vdfare insofar as protecting this country from an 
enemy >vas concerned. It hardly seems logieal to assume that 
laws removing the tax exemptions from those dedicated to 
the promotion of tlw general welfal'e lH·c·;wse the)' 1nir;ht, in 
the future, decide to do a turn-about-face and destr-oy tlw 
general welfare can be said to be a reasonable classification. 
If there is one principle that has al·ways (heretofore) been 
clearly understood in this country it is that every person is 
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The legislation involYecl. here pn'snnw~ ihat one re-
fusing to sign the oath has been, or will soon be, guilty of 
treasonable conduet. From what is said in the majority 
opinion it appears that this thought did oecur to the members 
of the eourt signing it. \V e arP informed that there is a pre-
sumption of innocence bnt that the assessor, beeause of it, is 
not relieved from making the investigation enjoined on him 
by law; that his administrative determindion is not binding 
on the tax exemption elaimant "but it is sufflcient to author-
ize him to tax the property as non-exrmpt and to place the 
bur-den on the claimant to test the validity of his administr-a-
tive deter-mination in a cou1·t of law.'' \Vhat is this but fore-
ing the supposedly subversive organization or person to prove 
1:tsclf or himself innocent beyond a reasonable doubt? 
In testing the reasonableness of the laws under attack here, 
the next question which presents itself is why are house-
holders excepted from those who must take the oath before 
any tax exemption is allowed them? \V e are told that the 
"segment of householders in this state is so owrwhelmingly 
large as compared with others ehm;('n for exemption that the 
cost of processing them would justify their separate classifica-
tion." If this class is so "overwhelmingly large" it would 
appear that if the old adage "in numbers lie strength" is 
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true, that this class should also be required to take the oath 
prior to claiming the exemption. It would also appear that 
mere difficulty in "processing" would be of little moment in 
an undertaking thought to be so vitally necessary. J:i'urther-
more, if the principle behind the oath is, as we are told, to 
prevent those dangerous persons from depleting the state's 
revenues, it would appear that this "overwhelmingly large" 
class might, even though the exemption is a relatively small 
one, deplete it even more than the revenues from tl10se which 
fall within the legislation. 1'he Supreme Court of the United 
States said (Louisville Gas & E. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 
37 r48 S.Ct. 423, 72 L.Ed. 770]) that "The equal proteetion 
elause, like the due process of law f•Jause, is not snseeptible 
of exact delimitation. No definite rule in respect of either, 
which automatically will solve the question in speeific in-
stances, can be formulated. Certain general principles, how-
ever, have been established in the light of which tbe cases as 
they arise are to be considered. In the first place, it may be 
said generally that the equal protection clause means that the 
rights of all persons must rest upon the same rule under 
similar circumstances, Kentucky Railr·oacZ Tax Cases, 115 U.S. 
321, 337 [6 S.Ct. 57, 29 IJ.Ed. 4141; JJfarJmm v. Illinois Trust 
&; Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 293 [18 S.Ct. 594, 42 L.Ed. 
1037], and tl1at it applies to the exercise of all the power;; 
of the state which can affect the individual or his property, 
including the power of taxation. Connfy of Santa Clara v. 
Southern Pac. R. Co., J8 F. 385, 388-399 [9 Savvy. 1651; The 
Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 733 [8 Sawy. 2381. It does 
not, however, forbid claflsification; and the power of the state 
to classify for purposes of taxation is of wide range and 
flexibility, provided always, that the classification 'must be 
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground 
of difference having a fair and substantial rrlation to tl1e 
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly cir-
cumstanced shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 I 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 LEd. 9891 ; 
Air-way etc. Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71. 85 145 S.Ct. 12, 69 
L.Ed. 169] ; Schlesinger V. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 240 r 46 
S.Ct. 260, 70 L.Ed. 557, 43 A.L.R. 12241. That is to say, 
1nere difference is not enough : the attempted classification 
'must always rest upon somr difference which bears a reason-
able and just relation to the act in respect to which the 
classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily 
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and without any such basis.' Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 [17 S.Ct. 255, 41 L.Ed. 666]." 
There is in my mind no doubt whatsoever that the legisla-
tion with which we are here concerned bears no relation what-
soever to the objective to be achieved. Presumably that ob-
jective is to stamp out, by any means at hand, the promulga-
tion of unpopular ideas. While the idea of the overthrow 
of the government of this country by force and violence in 
either peace or war is as abhorrent to me as it is to the ma-
jority of Americans, I am at a complete loss when it comes to 
imagining any reasonable theory on which the legislation in 
question can be considered an effective way of preventing such 
action. The tax itself is on property owned by churches and 
used for religious purposes and the exemption applies only 
when such property is used for such purposes. So far as the 
veteran's exemption is concerned, the tax to which it applies 
is also on property. Property taxes and unpopular beliefs or 
advocacy would appear to be as far apart as the poles and 
to bear no reasonable relationship one to the other. The 
classification here involved falls directly within the rule of 
the Louisville Gas case: it is arbitrary, it does not rest upon a 
difference bearing a reasonable and just relation to the act 
in respect to which the classification is proposed; it is a mere 
difference which ''is not enough.'' 
THE OATH Is A VIOLATION OF THE CoNsTITUTIONAL GuAR-
ANTEE OF FREEDOl\1[ OF SPEECH : 
In Danskin v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 28 Cal.2d 536, 
542 [ 171 P .2d 885], we held that "Freedom of speech and of 
peaceable assembly are protected by the First Amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States against infringement 
by Congress. They are likewise protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment against infringement by state Legislatures. 
(Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 [65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 
430] ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 [57 S.Ct. 255, 
81 L.Ed. 278] .) However reprehensible a Legislature may 
regard certain convictions or affiliations, it cannot forbid them 
if they present 'no clear and present danger that they will 
bring abotd the substantive evils' that the Legislature has a 
right to prevent. 'It is a question of proximity and degree.' 
(Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [39 S.Ct. 247, 63 
L.Ed. 470].) The United States Supreme Court has been 
alive to the difference between remote dangers and substantial 
ones, between remote dangers and immediate ones ... ' ... 
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Moreover, the likelihood, however great, that a substantive evil 
will result cannot alone justify a restriction upon freedom of 
speech or the press. The evil itself must be ''substantial,'' 
Brandeis, J., concurring in Whitney v. California, supra, 
274 U.S. at page 374; it must be "serious," id. 274 U.S. at 
page 376. And even the expression of "legislative preferences 
or beliefs'' cannot transform minor matters of public in-
convenience or annoyance into substantive evils of sufficient 
weight to warrant the curtailment of liberty of expression . 
. . . '" (Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 261 [62 S.Ct. 
190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R 1346], quoting from the con-
curring opinion of Mr. ,Justice Brandeis in "Whitney v. Cali-
fo1"nia, 247 U.S. 357, 374 [47 S.Ct. 641, 71 I.J.Ed. 1095].) 
A reading of the majority opinion leaves in the minds of 
the reader the implication that the ''clear and present dan-
ger" rule was abrogated by the later case of Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494 [71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137]. In the 
Dennis case it was specifically noted by the court that in the 
Smith Act ''Congress did not intend to eradicate the free dis-
cussion of political theories, to destroy the traditional rights 
of Americans to discuss and evaluate ideas without fear of 
governmental sanction. Rather Congress was concerned with 
the very kind of activity in which the evidence showed these 
petitioners engaged." It will be recalled that we have here 
no evidence that the churches and veterans involved were 
even so much as accused of the forbidden activities. In the 
Dennis case the petitioners had been found guilty by a jury 
of organizing a Communist party in the United States; in 
knowingly and wilfully teaching and advocating the over-
throw of our government by force and violence. The court 
also held that it had been determined that the evidence amply 
supported the necessary finding of the jury that the peti-
tioners "were unwilling to work within our framework of 
democracy, but intended to initiate a violent revolution when-
ever the propitious occasion appeared.'' In the majority 
opinion in the Dennis case it was said that "Overthrow of 
the Government by force ancl violence is certainly a substan-
tial enough interest for the Government to limit speech" and 
speaking of the "clear and present danger" rule it was said 
''Obviously, the words cannot mean that before the Govern-
ment may act, it must wait until the putsch is about to be 
executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is awaited. 
If Government is aware that a group m"ming at its overthrow 
is attempting to indoct1·inate its members and to commit them 
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to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel 
the circ1imstanccs perrnit, action by the Government is re-
quit'ed." (Emphasis added.) The court expressly rejected 
the contention that success or probability of success in over-
throwing the government was the criterion. The court then, 
in speaking of prior cases, said that the court had not been 
''confronted with any situation comparable to the instant one 
-the development of an apparatus designed and dedicated 
to the overthrow of the Government, in the context of world 
erisis after crisis.'' 'l'he Supreme Court then stated the rule, 
relied upon by the majority here, that "In each case [courts] 
must ask IYhether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is 
necessary to avoid the danger.'' This rule, following the 
court's language concerning what constituted a ''clear and 
present'' danger and read in the light of the facts as they 
were stated in the Dennis case, shows the absurdity of this 
tempest-in-a-teapot which which we are here confronted: there 
is no showing that the churches and veterans were highly 
organized into a war-like machine dedicated to the overthrow 
of the government by force and violence with leaders highly 
trained and ready to give the "word" when the time was ripe 
for revolution! The objects of the legislation, the objective 
alld the mc'ans used to achieve it are completely unrelated. 
\Vhene is the "danger" so far as churches and veterans are 
eoneerned? And does the denial of a charitable exemption 
consti tnte a reasonable attempt to save this country from 
revolution? Or does the oath involved just constitute an 
unconstitutional invasion of freedom of speech? In my 
opinion it eonstitutes an unconstitutional invasion of freedom 
of speeeh with the absurdity of the entire situation pin-
pointed by the thought that any embryo revolutionist would 
surely not hesitate to subscribe to sueh an oath. 
As Mr. ,Justice Douglas said in his dissenting opinion in 
the Dennis case, ''Full and free discussion keeps a society 
from beeoming stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and 
strainR that work to tear all eivilization apart. 
''Full and free discussion has indeed been the first artiele 
of our faith. \V e have founded our political system on it. 
It has been the safeguard of every religious, political. philo-
sophieal, economic, and raeial group amongst us. We have 
eounted on it to keep us from embraeing what is cheap and 
false; >ve have trusted the eommon sense of our people to 
choose the doctrine true to our genius and to reject the rest. 
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This has been the one single outstanding tenet that has made 
our institutions the symbol of freedom and equality. We 
have deemed it more costly to liberty to suppress a despised 
minority than to let them vent their spleen. vVe have above 
all else feared the political censor. We have wanted a land 
where our people can be exposed to all the diverse creeds and 
cultures of the world. 
"There comes a time when even speech loses its constitu-
tional immunity. Speeeh innocuous one year may at another 
time fan such destructive flames that it must be halted in 
the interests of the safety of the Republic. That is the mean-
ing of the clear and present danger test. ·when conditions 
are so eritical that there will be no time to avoid the evil 
that the speech threatens, it is time to eall a halt. Otherwise, 
free speech which is the strength of the Nation will be the 
cause of its destruction. 
''Yet free speech is the rule, not the exception. The re-
straint to be constitutional must be based on more than fear, 
on more than passionate opposition against thr sprech. on 
more than a revolted dislike for its contents. There must be 
some immediate injury to society that is likely if speech is 
allowed.'' 
Mr. Justice Douglas said that "If this were a case where 
those who claimed protection under the First Amendment 
were teaching the techniques of sabotage, the assassination of 
the President, the filching of documents from public files, 
the planting of bombs, the art of street warfare, and the like, 
I would have no doubts. The freedom to speak is not abso-
lute; the teaching of methods of terror and other seditious 
conduct should be beyond the pale along with obscenity and 
immorality. This case was argued as if those werr the facts. 
The argument imported much seditions conduct into the record. 
That is easy and it has popular appeal, for the activities of 
Communists in plotting and scheming against the free world 
are common knowledge. But the fact is that no such evi-
dence was introduced at thr trial." Thr book~ on Leninism 
and Communism, etc., whirh wrrr involvrd in the Drnnis casr 
were commented on by Mr. Justice Douglas as follows: "ThosE' 
books are to Soviet Communism what Mein Kampf was to 
Nazism. If they are understood, the ugliness of Communism 
is revealed, its deceit and cunning are exposed. the nature of 
its activities becomes apparent, and the chaners of its suc-
cess less likely. That is not, of course, the reason why peti-
tioners chose these books for their classrooms. They are fer-
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vent Communists to whom these volumes are gospel. They 
preached the creed with the hope that some day it would be 
acted upon." Mr. Justice Douglas then continued: "The 
vice of treating speech as the equivalent of overt acts of a 
treasonable or seditious character is emphasized by a con-
curring opinion [Mr. Justice Jackson], which by invoking the 
law of conspiracy makes speech do service for deeds which are 
dangerous to society .... I repeat that we deal here with 
speech alone, not with speech plus acts of sabotage or unlaw-
ful conduct. Not a single seditious act is charged in the in-
dictment. To make a lawful speech unlawful because two 
men conceive it is to raise the law of conspiracy to appalling 
proportions. That course is to make a radical break with the 
past and to violate one of the cardinal principles of our con-
stitutional scheme.'' 
I repeat that in the case at bar we haven't even had speech 
let alone any facts. Neither prejudice nor hate nor sense-
less fear should be the basis for abridging freedom of speech. 
''Free speech-the glory of our system of government-
should not be sacrificed on anything less than plain and ob-
jective proof of danger that the evil advocated is imminent." 
American democracy is no accident; it is the majestic prod-
uct of a vigorous, experimental and passionate history. This 
nation came into existence as the result of a purposeful struggle 
against governmental tyranny. The heritage of Thomas J ef-
ferson-"Rebellion to Tyrants is obedience to God"- re-
mains with us, embodied in our institutions and traditions. 
The spirit of Inquisition, which was abjured in the Declara-
tion of Independence, has always been obnoxious to our 
political and social life. Equally, it has found no tolerance 
in our legal codes, our legal traditions, our juridical morality. 
Due process has meant a fair, legal process. Liberty has 
meant genuine, concrete liberty for the individual citizen-his 
right to freedom from search and seizure, his right to privacy, 
his right to be free of persecutory inquisition on grounds of 
race, color, creed, political opinion or association. 
At this truly grave moment in our nation's growth it is in 
the power of this court to speak forthrightly in the language 
of Coke, Camden, and Bradley, in the language of the many 
illustrious jurists for whom the frenzy of the political market 
place never blurred the meaning of freedom. 
''Under our constitutional system courts stand against any 
winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might 
otherwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, 
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or because they are nonconforming victims of prejudice and 
public excitement .... No higher duty, nor more solemn 
responsibility, rests upon this Court, than that of translating 
into living law and maintaining this constitutional shield 
deliberately planned and inscribed for the benefit of every 
human being subject to our Constitution-of whatever race, 
creed or persuasion." (Chambers v. IJ'lorida ( 1940), 309 
U.S. 227, 241 [60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716].) 
\Vhat is required at this moment of this court is not in-
novation, but rather a restatement of the glowing principles 
by which the history of the western world has given dignity 
to its citizens : ''Historical liberties and privileges are not to 
bend from day to day because of some accident of immediate 
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and dis-
torts the judgment. A community whose judges would be 
willing to give it whatever law might gratify the impulse of 
the moment would find in the end that it had paid too high a 
price." (Cardozo, J., JJ1atter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 268 
[177 N.E. 489].) 
The issue is momentous, of far-reaching implication, and 
the ruling of the court will be a categorical imperative whose 
cumulative effect will be seen only in the fullness of time. 
"Nothing less is involved than that which makes for an 
atmosphere of freedom as against a feeling of fear and re-
pression for society as a whole. The dangers are not fanciful. 
We too readily forget them. Recollection may be refreshed 
as to the happenings after the first World War by the 
'Report Upon the Illegal Practices of the United States De-
partment of Justice,' which aroused the public concern of 
Chief Justice Hughes (then at the bar), and by the little 
book entitled 'The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty' 
by Louis F. Post, who spoke with the authoritative knowledge 
of an Assistant Secretary of Labor.'' (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting, Harris v. United States (1947), 331 U.S. 145, 173 
[67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399].) 
Devotion to Americanism often calls for something other 
than conformity. The plaintiff in the present case knew that 
to protect the Constitution, indeed merely to invoke its pro-
tection for all Americans, required courage, and that hardi-
hood to challenge a wrong done under color of authority was 
as indispensable to good citizenship as would be, in other 
circumstances, unquestioning obedience. President Thomas 
Jefferson wrote to Benjamin Rush in a letter dated April 21, 
1803: "It behooves every man who values liberty of con-
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science for himself, to resist invasions of it in the case of 
others; or their ease may, by change of circumstances, become 
his own. l t behooves him, too, in his own case to give no 
of concession, betraying the common right of inde-
pendent opinion, by answering questions of faith which the 
laws have left between God and himself." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
In the last analysis, when the moment of decision comes, 
to the private citizen as well as to the judge, it is in the quiet 
of his own mind and in the glow of his own courage that 
Americanism thrives. And it is in the cumulative decision of 
eitizeu as well as official, that Americanism is reborn 
each moment. 
Por the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 22, 
HJG7. Gibson, C .• J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the 
opinioll that the petition should be granted. 
[S. F. No. 19450. In Bank. Apr. 24, 1957.] 
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[1] Taxation-Exemptions-Veterans.-Const., art. XX, § 19, lim-
the n~tcrans' tax exemption to those otherwise entitled 
who do not advocate the overthrow of federal or state govern-
ment by force and violence or the support of a foreign 
ftovernment in the event of hostilities against the United 
States, and Rev. & Tax. Code, § 32, requiring a declaration of 
loyalty on claiming exemption from property tax, are valid; 
such code section does not fallaciously infer that those who 
do not subscribe to the oath engage in the prohibited activity. 
[2] Statutes-Title and Subject Matter-Constitutional Provision. 
--Const., art. XX, § 19, relating to subversive persons and 
groups, does not violate Const., art. IV, § 24, declaring that 
ewry act shall c>mbrace but one subject which shall be ex-
prc>ssed in its titl<~, since article IV deals with the "Legislative 
Departnwnt" and section 24 is intended to be and has been 
limited to legislative enactments under the Constitution. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 93; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 546 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 79(2); [2] Statutes, § 38. 
